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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Various regional integration efforts have gained momentum in the past two 
decades in Latin America, including the Andean Community, the Southern Common 
Market, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Union of South American Nations, 
and the most recent addition, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. In 
other parts of the world, such as the European Union, joining into regional integration 
organizations often requires the states involved to sacrifice or surrender certain elements 
of national sovereignty and identity.  In the European Union case, some states involved in 
the economic union have ceded their national currencies, a form of national sovereignty, 
to the European Union.   
 Supranational integration efforts affect national as well as local economies, 
politics, and questions surrounding identities. Governments across Latin America have 
signed on to many of these accords including those organizations mentioned above.  The 
citizens of these countries, however, have long been left out of any formal decision 
making process on joining these organizations and what elements of national identity and 
sovereignty they are willing to sacrifice or surrender in the process. In large part, the 
viability of South American regional integration may be influenced by how the common 
citizens perceive the process, or if they are even aware of these regional integration
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efforts.  
 While these regional integration organizations have become commonplace in 
Latin America in the past two decades, Bolivia, a state with a chaotic history and a 
complex ethnic composition, has experienced many internal changes in state and civil 
society during that same time period.   A cohesive national identity in Bolivia has 
historically been an elusive goal.  As a result, Bolivians have complex and multiple 
notions of what it is to be Bolivian.  Recent transformations, including the rise of the 
popular indigenous party Movimiento al Socialismo, the exile of former President 
Sánchez de Lozada to the United States, the election and re-election of President Evo 
Morales in 2005 and 2009, and the creation of the new Constitution in 2009, have left 
“Bolivian identity…in a state of flux; many Bolivians were ‘redefining’ and even 
questioning what it meant to be Bolivian, thanks in part to Bolivia’s first indigenous 
president, Evo Morales” (Armstrong 2007, 34).     
 In relation to all these changes that Bolivia has experienced in the past fifteen 
years, it is the purpose of this research to first understand if Bolivians are even aware of 
this process of regional integration occurring in South America.  Second, it the purpose of 
this research to understand whether Bolivians are willing to surrender certain aspects of 
their national identity (currency, anthem) and sovereignty (control over the territory’s 
borders) to a supranational institution in order to join in regional organizations such as 
the Union of South American Nations, the Southern Common Market, etc.  
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Research Questions 
 The guiding research questions of this study are: 
1).  Are Bolivians even aware of this process to integrate economically and politically the 
continent of South America?   
2).  Are Bolivians willing to maintain or surrender certain elements of national 
sovereignty and identity (passport & border control, the national currency, and the 
national anthem) in the integration process?   
 The main objectives of this study are: 
1). To understand if Bolivians have any knowledge of the current regional integration 
efforts in South America, including the Southern Common Market, the Andean 
Community, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Union of South American 
Nations, and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, all of which 
organizations Bolivia is a member (full or associate). 
2).  To understand what elements of national sovereignty and identity (national currency, 
border control, passport control, and national anthem) Bolivians are willing to 
surrender in this integration process for increased membership in these above 
mentioned organizations. 
3). Employing a geographic perspective (through the use of mapping software), to 
understand whether any geographic patterns exist either supporting or rejecting 
increased regional integration efforts. 
4). To understand what symbols of identities (local, national, or supranational) are most 
prevalent across the Bolivian landscape. 
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Study Area 
Although the title of this research is the viability of South American regional 
integration, it is beyond the scope of this project to address the perspectives of all South 
Americans.  I therefore focused only on taking a sample of Bolivian citizen’s 
perspectives on identity and proposed regional integration. 
The area under study in this investigation is the Pluri-national State of Bolivia, a 
landlocked country in central South America (See Figure 1).  Bolivia is located near the 
center of the South American continent and covers an area of approximately 1,098,581 
square kilometers (CIA 2010).  Bolivia is bordered by Brazil to the northeast, Paraguay to 
the southeast, Argentina to the south, Chile to the west, and Peru to the northwest.  The 
population of Bolivia is 9,775,246 as of July 2009 (CIA 2010).  Within Bolivia, more 
than approximately sixty percent of the population self identifies as indigenous (Albo 
2008). 
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Figure 1.  Reference Map of Bolivia and neighboring countries. 
 
 Bolivia is a physically diverse country- with nearly half of the territory in the 
highlands and valleys of the Andes Mountains and the other half covering the lowland 
Amazon basin (See Figure 2).  It is a country of extremes- having one of the highest cities 
in the world (Potosí), one of the largest salt deserts in the world (Salar de Uyuni), as well 
as many tributaries of the world’s largest river, the Amazon.    
 Bolivia has two capitals, the administrative or de-facto capital of La Paz, where 
the Congress and President are located, and the constitutional capital of Sucre, where the 
judicial branch of the government is located.  The country is divided into nine 
departments including Beni, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Pando, Potosí, 
Santa Cruz, and Tarija. The majority of the population lives in the highland and altiplano 
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cities of La Paz, El Alto, Sucre, Potosí, Oruro, Cochabamba, and the lowland commercial 
hub of Santa Cruz. 
 
Figure 2. Topographical Map of Bolivia (Source: Klein 1992, 5)
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CHAPTER II 
 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL IDENTITY, 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION, AND BOLIVIA. 
 
Introduction 
 Part of understanding the viability of South American regional integration efforts 
depends on the nation-states involved in these processes.  Some of the countries involved 
in these efforts, like Bolivia, have struggled in establishing stable and functional 
governments and cohesive civic national identities.  The concept of a national identity 
assumes that there is an internal level of trust between the government and the population 
living within that territory.  If a nation-state lacks a unified civic national identity, the 
citizens of that state may not trust the government and may be more willing to surrender 
certain notions of national identity and national sovereignty to a higher authority, simply 
because these elements of identity and sovereignty are not prominently tied to the 
personal identity of those citizens.   
 In other words, in countries like Bolivia, because of the historic mistrust between 
the people and the government, other identities- local, religious, gender, class, regional, 
etc. may take on a stronger role than the civic national identity created by the 
government.  In other countries, such as Argentina, that perhaps possess a more unified 
national identity, the citizens may be opposed to ceding certain elements of their national
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identity and sovereignty to a supranational power, perhaps because the notion of a 
national identity is largely intertwined with the personal identities of those citizens. 
 In Latin America, some scholars argue that nation-states have developed largely 
in relation to a wider regional identity set forth by the Iberian colonial powers (Masur 
1966, Whitaker and Jordan 1966).   This has provided common ground in many of the 
regional integration efforts throughout the region.  A short review of the ideas behind 
regional integration, as well as examples of regional integration efforts in Latin America, 
and more specifically South America, will help set up the context of this investigation.  
The final part of this chapter summarizes Bolivia within this context.   
Background on Regional Integration Efforts  
 Regional economic integration ideas stem from a structuralist framework, a 
prominent theory in international political economy, and are a clear example of the idea 
that increased trade among neighboring states will create long term shared interests and 
relative peace (Spero and Hart 2003).  Belassa (1961) and Glassner and Fahrer (2004, 
348) note that economic integration is a process with several steps, leading towards the 
goal of “complete economic [and political] integration.”  The first step is a free trade 
area, where the tariffs on commerce are reduced between two or more countries, while 
tariffs to external parties remain intact (Glassner and Fahrer 2004). The second step in 
this process is a customs union, where a common external tariff is agreed upon, in 
addition to the abolishment of tariffs between member countries (Belassa 1961). The 
third step is a common market, basically “a customs union plus the free movement” of 
people, goods, and capital throughout the member states (Glassner and Fahrer 2004, 348). 
The fourth step is an economic union, where common economic and monetary policies, 
 9
uniform business laws, and a common currency are the objectives (Glassner and Fahrer 
2004).  The last step is total economic and political integration, which requires the 
establishment of supranational institutions that have authority over the member states 
(Belassa 1961).  The European Union is the most widely studied example of this type of 
regional integration.    
Of all the steps towards economic regional integration, surrendering sovereignty 
to a supranational power is the biggest challenge for many regional integration efforts, 
even in the European case.  As Belassa (1961, 3) notes, “political obstacles can be singled 
out as the main causes for failures of these projects to materialize.” Joining together and 
compromising political interests is much more difficult than entering into an economic 
integration effort, in essence merely reducing trade barriers.  Political integration 
involves first coordinating, compromising, and re-negotiating interests, relationships, 
agendas, and identities.  Second, it requires trust among neighbors.  Last, it involves 
surrendering some elements of national sovereignty to a higher supranational institution.  
 Although many countries join regional integration efforts for mainly economic 
reasons, a degree of political unity is also necessary for any successful integration effort.  
Glassner and Fahrer (2004, 348) agree, noting an “economic union without some form of 
political union is probably impossible.” Etzioni (2004) argues for the need for equal parts 
of economic and political integration for any successful, long-term regional integration 
effort. 
 Political integration requires extensive binding measures and supranational 
institutions that can enforce such measures.  Etzioni (2004, 179) defines supranationality 
as a way  
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“to characterize a political body that has acquired some of the attributes 
usually associated with a nation, such as political loyalty and decision-
making power- based not on an aggregate of national decisions or those by 
representatives of the member states, but rather on those made by the 
supranational bodies themselves.” 
 
In large part, supranational institutions are needed to carry out decision-making (without 
being entirely reliant on the nation-state members), to produce supranational laws (not 
subject to national government’s decisions), and to be able to enforce such laws and 
make the member states abide by these laws (Etzioni 2004). The institutions themselves 
must be independent of the governments of the member states.   
 This also implies that individual nation-states will have to give up some of their 
decision-making power and sovereignty to the supranational institutions.   As Etzioni 
(2004, 180) notes, “supranationality presumes some surrender of sovereignty by the 
member nations.”  Although this is a give and take process, Deustch (1968, 187) writes of 
the importance of the “deliberate transfer of sovereignty” that nation-states give these 
institutions, in large part providing the foundation of credibility and legitimacy of that 
regional integration effort.  The key to any viable regional integration effort is that the 
nation-state must be willing to give up some responsibilities and sovereignty to a 
supranational entity.  
Regional Integration in Latin America 
The idea of joining together the sovereign South American nation-states is not a 
contemporary idea.  Although South America boasts two major geographic obstacles, the 
Andes Mountains and the Amazon River basin, early on the poor and often isolated 
countries of the continent realized that by pooling all the resources of the continent 
together, as well as increasing political cooperation and trade, collectively the nation-
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states would prosper.   The idea of joining the South American nation-states together has 
been a prominent theme in the political and economic discourse of the continent since the 
nineteenth century, the era of Símon Bolívar (Vanden and Prevost 2009).   
After many Latin American countries achieved independence from Spain in the 
early nineteenth century, some of the revolutionary leaders, including Símon Bolívar and 
José de San Martín, proposed wider regional entities such as Gran Colombia, a 
supranational entity encompassing today’s Venezuela, Ecuador and Colombia (Masur 
1966).   Since then, scholars, politicians, and revolutionary leaders have all debated this 
idea of joining the South American states into a continental entity, tied together by a 
common identity.    
During the nineteenth century, these ideas did not produce any results, however, 
as internal challenges, such as nation building and civil wars, and external problems such 
as the U.S. Monroe Doctrine, took top priority.  By the early twentieth century, Latin 
America was largely isolated from the rest of the global community and economy 
(López- Alves 2000). As a result of this situation, Latin America economically stagnated 
for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  As a reaction to this situation 
of economic isolation and the desire for Latin America to dominate its own future, the 
idea to join together economically and politically became more viable. The characteristics 
of common languages and Iberian colonial legacies held in common, and the loosely 
established regional Latin American identity, facilitated people coming together to 
discuss this idea of integrating the region. 
 On a wider regional scale, many proposals have been advanced for Latin 
American regional integration.  However, most of these efforts have only been attempts 
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at regional integration, meaning that although the nation-states of the region share, in 
part, a common identity, something has prevented the countries of the region from further 
political and economic integration.  Many organizations exist on paper (such as the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States, etc.).  See Table 1. 
Table 1.  Comparison of Regional Integration Efforts in Western Hemisphere, 2010.   
Comparison of Regional Integration Efforts in Western Hemisphere, as of 2010.  
Name Acronym Originating Date 
Central American Common Market CACM 1960 
Andean Community CAN 1969 
Caribbean Community CARICOM 1973 
Southern Common Market Mercosur 1990 
North American Free Trade Association NAFTA 1992 
Free Trade Area of the Americas FTAA 2001 
Bolivarian Alliance for the America ALBA 2004 
Union of South American Nations UNASUR 2008 
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States   2010 
(Source: Clawson 2006, Banús Vidal 2007, Sotomayor 2008, Hennigan 2010) 
The significance of such actions shows that from early on, there existed an inclination 
towards joining together the sovereign Latin American nation-states. Yet, increased 
integration has proved an elusive goal for the region. 
Recent Latin American Regional Integration Efforts 
  The Latin American nation-states, relatively weak by themselves in the 
international community, sought regional integration as a way to combine interests, to 
promote Latin American unity, and to gain agency in their own development.  Since the 
mid-twentieth century, the Latin Americans have attempted many efforts to join the 
region together.1  The Latin American Free Trade Association (L.A.F.T.A.) was created 
                                                 
1
 There is a need to differentiate between Latin American integration efforts and South American 
integration efforts.  Latin America encompasses all the countries from Mexico to Patagonia.  It includes 
Mexico, some of the Caribbean countries, as well as the Central and South American nation-states.  
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in 1960 and later reorganized in 1980 as the Latin American Integration Association 
(L.A.I.A.) (Hufbauer, et al. 1994).   In large part, the Cartagena de las Indias Agreement 
of 1969, establishing the Andean Group, was a consequence of the shortcomings of the 
L.A.F.T.A. and the lack of influence experienced by smaller nation-states within that 
organization (Salgado Penaherrera 1985).    In 1996, it later reorganized as the Andean 
Community (Kennes 2000).  The Latin American Economic System, created in 1975, is 
another example of an early Latin American regional integration effort (Clawson 2006).    
  The first round of Latin American regional integration efforts, including those 
mentioned above, failed for many reasons. The era from the 1960s through the mid 1980s 
in Latin America was a time much like that of the interwar period in Europe- with 
conflicting nationalisms, military dictatorships, failing democratic regimes, and 
stagnating economies. It was a period of protectionist economic policies, through import 
substitution measures, and a focus on all things national (economy, identity, political 
agenda, reputation, etc.) (Cardoso and Falletto 1979).  During this time, these problems 
were especially commonplace in South America. 
South American Regional Integration Efforts 
 Several authors, such as Cason and Burrell (2002, 458) and Lowenthal (1993, 74) 
refer to the 1980s in South America as the “lost decade,” due to the fact that many 
internal civil problems as well as national economic and political crises were routine 
during the 1980s (Cason and Burrell 2002).  In many South American nation-states 
(namely Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru) military regimes, 
dictatorships, and struggling democracies were the norm.  Additionally, between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
South American integration efforts involve only those nations located in South America (Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Suriname, and Guyana. 
French Guiana is excluded, as it is a French overseas department) (Source: Clawson 2006). 
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various countries of South America, conflicting ideologies, geopolitics, and competing 
nationalisms were also common at that time period (Somavia 1985; Knox and Agnew 
1989).  Argentina’s Dirty War and the invasion of the Falkland Islands serve as only a 
single country’s examples that most attention during the 1960s through the end of the 
1980s was focused inward- on enlarging the national interests, creating a stronger 
national economy or military, or increasing the consciousness of that state’s national 
identity (Cason and Burrell 2002).  
 In recent decades, due to de-militarization and re-democratization in South 
America, there has been renewed interest in South American regional integration (J. 
Dominguez 2007). The end of the Cold War and the increasing interdependence of the 
early 1990s in the international community and global economy proved that the 
protectionist stance and the inward views that most of South America adopted during this 
time were no longer functional.  The idea for a strictly South American regional 
association, rather than another full Latin American attempt, came about as a product of 
first, the re-democratization period in the Southern Cone area in the late 1980s 
(Hufbauer, et al. 1994), and second, geographic proximity and the commonalities of a 
“continental” or regional Latin American identity (Masur 1966, 68).  
The Southern Common Market 
 In the late 1980s, Argentina and Brazil both sought regional support in their 
democratization process by tying their economies and political agendas to the wider 
regional integration process (Pion- Berlin 2000; Coffey 1998).  As a result of Brazil and 
Argentina’s desires, in 1991, the Southern Common Market (Mercado Comun del Sur) or 
Mercosur was established (Kennes 2000, Arieti 2006). This customs union has four 
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original members: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru are associate members (Jovanovic 1998).   
The stated “goals of Mercosur are to eliminate trade barriers, establish a common 
external tariff, coordinate macroeconomic policies, and develop the harmonization of 
laws” (Arieti 2006, 764).  The plan for Mercosur to evolve economically from a free 
trade area to a customs union, and eventually to a common market, has been a slow 
process.  Arieti (2006) notes of temporary institutions that have limited the growth of this 
organization.  These ad hoc institutions include three main structures. 
The institutions of the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) are the Common 
Market Council (Consejo del Mercado Común or CMC), in charge of coordinating the 
meetings of national Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economics, and other ministries 
(Vervaele 2005).  The Common Market Group (Grupo del Mercado Común, or GMC) is 
the main executive body and runs most of the working groups, as well as meetings of the 
Heads of State (Preusse 2004).  The final institution of Mercosur is the Administrative 
Secretariat, in charge of daily administrative tasks (Preusse 2004).  Carranza (2006, 817) 
notes of Mercosur’s “nomadic style of decision making” where the meetings and leaders 
are always rotating among the countries.  As J. Dominguez (2007, 109) notes, 
“Mercosur’s only permanent institutions are its Administrative Secretariat.” The 
Common Market Group and Council do not have established headquarters.  In fact, the 
Secretariat is the only one of the three institutions that is based in one country, located in 
Montevideo, Uruguay (Preusse 2004). 
Another major challenge for the regional integration effort deals with the 
Mercosur institutions’ lack of supranational powers.  All pending legislation must be 
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ratified and accepted by individual national governments before they can be put into 
Mercosur law (J. Dominguez 2007).  As Vervaele (2005, 394) notes, the 
“application of Mercosur law is one of the major problems.  Only forty 
percent of always-unanimous decisions have been effectively incorporated 
by all states parties and have therefore entered into force.  There are no 
supranational Mercosur institutions charged with the supervision of 
compliance with Mercosur law.” 
 
Carranza (2006) calls Mercosur an intergovernmental organization, because the 
institutions lack authority over the nation-states.  Vervaele (2005, 392) agrees, noting, 
“Mercosur is an intergovernmental organization with community objectives, but not a 
supranational organization.”  In essence, Mercosur has largely been a state-led regional 
integration effort, which means that it still relies heavily upon the historic leaders of the 
Southern Cone area, Argentina and Brazil. 
Although Mercosur has been an integral player in promoting wider regional 
integration in South America, it is itself somewhat limited from expanding into a larger 
political union (Arieti 2006).  Arieti (2006, 765) notes, “because neither the Treaty of 
Asunción nor the Ouro Preto Protocol contemplated the expansion of Mercosur’s 
membership, the common market lacks formal procedures for admitting new members.” 
Originally, only the four member states could participate in the organization’s 
institutions, meaning that the associate member states were not considered real members 
of the customs union.  This shows the shortsighted goals of this organization were only to 
integrate these countries economically, and nothing further (Cammack 1999).  
In sum, Mercosur has provided a strong example in the South American context 
that the rest of the continent, and other regions in the developing world, can identify with, 
follow, and build upon.  However, it is severely limited in its potential expansion.  The 
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short sighted goals of Mercosur, coupled with the lack of solid supranational institutions, 
as well as the continuing reliance upon the nation-states for authority and legitimacy are a 
few reasons why Mercosur has experienced limited success. As a result of these issues, 
the organization lacks credibility and legitimacy, as it is unable to enforce any laws or 
make member-states abide by Mercosur's norms.  
The Andean Community 
 Another current example of regional integration in South America is the 
Comunidad de Naciones Andinas or the Andean Community. Originally formed under 
the Cartagena de las Indias Agreement in 1969 as the Andean Group, the Andean 
Community is the longest existing regional integration effort in South America (Clawson 
2006).  It reorganized as the Andean Community in 1996 and is headquartered in Lima, 
Peru.  Currently, the members of this customs union are Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and 
Colombia, with Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil as associate 
members (Andean Community 2009).   
In large part an imitation of the European Community, the Pacto Andino created 
supranational structures, including the Andean Council or administrative body; the 
Andean Commission or decision-making body; the Andean Parliament; and the Andean 
Court of Justice, based largely upon the European Court of Justice (Hufbauer, et al. 1994, 
233).  Andean leaders have agreed that the goal of the Andean Group is to establish “an 
integrated economic group like the European Community” (Hufbauer, et al. 1994, 233).   
By tying the economies of the member countries together, the Andean Group 
attempted to facilitate trade relations and pushed joint industrial development.  These 
attempts did not succeed in large part because economic integration was implemented 
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during the 1970s, when many Andean nations were reacting to previous policies of 
import substitution and high external tariffs (Clawson 2006).  These two policies 
prevented foreign investment from being included in the Andean nation’s 
industrialization process, thus stagnating regional integration efforts.  Furthermore, the 
Andean Group attempted to integrate in a process in which individual sectors of national 
economies were entirely integrated before moving on to another sector (Nogues and 
Quintanilla 1993).  Bulmer- Thomas (1997, 245-246) notes,  
“The Sectoral Programme of Industrial Development (SPID)… was 
designed to distribute new industrial capacity among the member 
countries in such a way as to exploit economies of scale and ensure the 
participation of all countries.”  
 
However, because not all member states were on the same level economically, 
those countries with already established infrastructure and industries received the 
majority of the funding by the SPID (Bulmer-Thomas 1997, 246). This policy tended to 
favor the more economically stable countries and almost provoked Bolivia’s withdrawal 
from the Andean Group in 1980 (Bulmer-Thomas 1997). 
Although “the Andean Pact has developed the most elaborate institutional 
structure” of all the Latin American regional integration efforts, the Andean Group faced, 
and as the Andean Community continues to face many challenges (Kennes 2000, 157). 
First, the member states did not readily accept the binding notion of Andino law.   As 
Vervaele (2005, 390) notes “the States parties were not prepared to accept the binding 
effect of Andino law.”  This required that every decision created by the Andean Group 
had to be approved by the national governments before it could become law, a process 
that led to much frustration and Chile’s eventual withdrawal from the organization in 
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1976. The legislative process of the Andean Community is a challenge that the remaining 
nation-states have yet to overcome.  
Second, supranational institutions in the Andean Community still heavily rely on 
nation-state power and policy for implementation and action.  This is clear in the fact that 
decisions made at the supranational level must be accepted by national governments 
before they become Andino law (Vervaele 2005).  This is a serious limitation to the 
effectiveness and viability of the supranational institutions of the Andean Community, 
and ultimately, in becoming a full economic union (Glassner and Fahrer 2004).   
Third, geopolitical disputes were and still are influential among some of the 
members of the Andean Community, as well as throughout Latin America (Kacowicz 
2000).  Salgado Penaherrera (1985, 175) notes “a territorial dispute, with the serious 
problems that this entails for economic integration, occurred when there was an armed 
confrontation between Peru and Ecuador” in 1981.  More recently, when Colombian 
officials crossed into Ecuador in March 2008 to kill a wanted FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia) leader, Ecuador argued that its territorial sovereignty had 
been violated.  Both Ecuador and Venezuela quickly threatened to break off diplomatic 
relations and possibly counteract with an attack (Lafuente 2009).  This rift also led to 
Venezuela bailing out of the Andean Community and becoming a more active member in 
Mercosur, as well as to the creation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Bellamy 
Foster 2007).  
 In short, the Andean Community was a byproduct of previous regional integration 
efforts, such as LAFTA, in which the smaller Andean nation-states voices’ were not 
heard, nor were their needs addressed. The Andean Community has had limited success 
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in creating a viable regional integration organization over the past four decades for 
various reasons.  Although an imitation of the European Community in institutions and 
structure, the Andean Community has been plagued by external problems such as the 
economic crisis of the mid 1980s as well as internal problems such as legal and 
legislative handicaps, commercial and industrial issues, as well as trust and territorial 
disputes between member states.  Furthermore, the organization’s institutions seriously 
lack coercive or supranational power to make the countries abide by the organization’s 
rules (Vervaele 2005).  For these reasons, the Andean Community never could fully 
count on the support of its members. Instead of regional integration, the Andean 
Community has experienced regional disintegration with the loss of Chile (1976) and 
Venezuela (2005) as member states (Hufbauer, et al. 1994, J. Dominguez 2007). 
The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas 
The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Alianza Bolivariana para las 
Americas- ALBA) is another recent regional integration effort created by Cuba and 
Venezuela in 2004, in part to counterbalance the U.S. sponsored Free Trade Agreement 
of the Americas (FTAA). Thus far, the more left leaning administrations in Latin 
America, including Bolivia, Honduras, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and the Caribbean island 
states of Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and San Vicente and Grenadines have joined 
this effort (PortalAlba 2009).  ALBA’s main goals are mostly social, which include 
reducing region wide poverty and smoothing out the region’s disparities and inequalities 
(Banús Vidal 2007). They are also economic, with the Bank of the South providing an 
alternative to the way Latin America nation-states deal with loans, external debt, 
international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as 
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well as the way these developing countries interact with the more powerful, industrialized 
countries of the world (Alarcón 2007). Yet, the principal goal of the ALBA is increased 
regional integration, joining together the nation-states of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, providing a “real alternative to neo-liberalism with a strong social and human 
content” (Alarcón 2007, 3). 
ALBA’s stated goals are first, “to foster a model of regional integration where the 
interests of the people are above those of the market” (F. Dominguez 2007, 4).  Second, 
the goals of ALBA are to establish a regional economic union, with a common currency 
called “the Sucre” (Hart-Landsberg 2009, 10).  In terms of regional integration aims, the 
goals of ALBA for the long-term have more to do with further social, political, as well as 
economic integration rather than just increased access to national and world markets.  
  The main institutions of the ALBA are the Presidential Council, the main 
decision making group, and the Ministerial Council or legislative body (Hart-Landsberg 
2009).   An “advisory council of social movements” also helps to keep the other two 
institutions accountable and to promote popular participation in the integration process 
(Hart-Landsberg 2009, 8).  
 The Bank of the South, or Banco del Sur, is another institution under the umbrella 
of the ALBA that provides an alternative source of funds to the developing economies of 
South America. Rather than the stringent policies and loans sponsored by the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization, Latin 
American nation-states are able to obtain favorable loans without all the strings attached 
(Banús Vidal 2007).  As F. Dominguez (2007, 7) notes, “The Bank of the South is seen 
as a key instrument in the ongoing process of regional integration.”  However, rules and 
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norms concerning organizational structure of the Bank, members’ participation in 
proposal setting, project pushing, and decision-making, etc., have yet to be decided (Hart-
Landsberg 2009).  Therefore, the Bank of the South has yet to function fully. 
The ALBA strives to be a different form of regional integration in Latin America 
and the Caribbean through increased accountability of national and regional leaders, and 
augmented transparency in national governments, regional organizations, and 
multinational corporations.  It also promotes the idea of increased popular participation in 
decision making at all levels.  Suarez Salazar (2006, 30) notes that the ALBA does 
promote greater democratic participation and accountability.  Although the goals of 
ALBA do include sections on transparency and corruption, the top down approach of the 
ALBA leaves the “transparency, participation, and accountability” in question (Mallen 
2007, 7).  In short, as Hart-Landsberg (2009, 8) notes, the ALBA emphasizes “state-
directed activity,” leaving little room for popular participation and leaving ample room 
for elite led initiatives and, furthermore, corruption. 
The ALBA was in large part created by Venezuela and it remains quite reliant on 
the leadership of Venezuela, under Hugo Chavez, to provide the rhetorical and financial 
backing for the organization. Hart-Landsberg (2009, 11) notes, “ALBA remains heavily 
dependent on the decisions of the Presidents of the participating countries.”  The new 
organization’s reliance on the nation-states (especially Venezuela and Cuba) for decision 
making and for setting agendas and priorities makes the new organization especially 
vulnerable to the “leadership and financial generosity” of Venezuela (Hart-Landsberg 
2009, 11). Suarez Salazar (2006, 31) concurs, noting the ALBA is “dependent on the 
evolution of Venezuela’s political and economic situation.”  Another problem lingers on 
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the fact that Venezuela’s wealth is largely earned through the sale of hydrocarbons on 
fluctuating world markets, thus also making the ALBA incredibly vulnerable to shifts in 
the international economy.  In turn, this also makes the other members of the ALBA 
vulnerable to changes in Venezuela’s administration and in the international economy.   
  Although serious challenges do exist, the ALBA represents the “first time that 
several countries join together to promote a cultural strategy.  It’s unprecedented in the 
history of our continent” (Sierra 2008, 4).  As Banús Vidal (2007, 50) argues, ALBA’s 
“objective is not to create a common market or promote neo-liberal economic 
development but to cooperate with the integration of Latin America countries to correct 
social inequalities and ensure a growing quality of life.”  In this statement, the author 
provides a simple definition of the ALBA’s ambitions, which do not specify any 
supranational institutions, or refer to the transfer of national sovereignty in this process.  
 As Banús Vidal (2007, 50) notes, “the Bolivarian Constitution does not refer to 
[state] sovereignty nor to the creation of communal bodies, or “supranationals,” as is the 
case of the European Union or the Andean Community.”  She goes on to add, “Thus, 
ALBA cannot be considered yet as an integration scheme” (Banús Vidal 2007, 50). 
Although still in its infancy, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas does not yet appear 
to be a viable long-term regional integration effort.   
The Union of South American Nations 
Another effort in South American regional integration is the Union of South 
American Nations.  In addition to Chile, Guyana, and Suriname, the nation-states of 
Mercosur and the members of the Andean Community joined together on May 23, 2008 
to create the most extensive and comprehensive regional integration effort in South 
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America thus far.  La Union de Naciones Sudamericanas or the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) is a supranational and intergovernmental union that plans 
to tie two of the existing customs unions (Mercosur and the Andean Community) 
together (Andean Community 2009).  The Union of South American Nations has twelve 
members, including all of the South American countries with the exception of French 
Guiana (Sotomayor 2008).   
The stated goals of UNASUR are to evolve into a full economic and monetary 
union (Andean Community 2009).  As Pereira Valadão (2007) notes, the goal of 
UNASUR is to unite and integrate culturally, politically, economically, and socially the 
peoples of South America.  As Sotomayor (2008, 2) adds, “the central objectives of 
UNASUR are the strengthening of political dialogue between member states and the 
deepening of regional integration.”  This includes coordination of infrastructure, 
environmental and energy policies, financial and industrial integration, “economic and 
commercial cooperation,” the creation of a common South American identity and 
citizenship, and cooperation in common defense matters (Pereira Valadão 2007, 502).  
The proposed institutional bodies for UNASUR include the Council of Heads of 
State and Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of 
Delegates, and the General Secretariat (UNASUR 2009).   The Council of Heads of State 
is the highest institution within UNASUR. It will coordinate the annual meeting of the 
Heads of State and has the responsibilities to research, debate, and push policies, projects, 
and proposals (UNASUR 2009).  The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is charged 
with overseeing the integration process, as well as the responsibility to “develop and 
promote political dialogue and coordination on themes of regional and international 
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interest” (UNASUR 2009, 68).  The Council of Delegates will be responsible for the 
implementation part of the legislative process, in essence putting the decisions of the 
Council of Heads of State and the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs into action (UNASUR 2009).  The General Secretariat will be in charge of the 
many administrative tasks, in addition to “executing the mandates conferred upon by the 
organs of UNASUR” (UNASUR 2009, 68).  As UNASUR has only existed for a year 
and a half, all these institutions have yet to truly develop and function. 
Pereira Valadão (2007) notes that a South American Parliament is in the process 
of being established.  In coordination with the legislative institutions of Chile, Guyana, 
and Suriname, the Andean Community Parliament, Mercosur’s Common Market 
Council, and the new South American Parliament (under UNASUR) is attempting to 
include the voices of all current organizations.   Additionally, a Pro-Tempore Presidency 
will rotate among the member-states for one-year period (UNASUR 2009).  The 
Presidency will have the responsibilities of representing UNASUR in international events 
as well as presiding over the meetings of the various organs of UNASUR (UNASUR 
2009). 
As UNASUR plans to tie the two existing customs unions (Mercosur and the 
Andean Community) together, it will be challenged by some of the existing issues and 
problems associated with Mercosur and the Andean Community.  The Andean 
Community, as noted previously, has been plagued by territorial disputes and general 
mistrust between the member states.  The twenty-two ongoing territorial disputes causing 
tension between South American nation-states clearly display this festering mistrust (CIA 
2010).  Also as noted previously, Mercosur has largely been led by Argentina and Brazil, 
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in large part leading to a power struggle between the national governments within the 
Southern Cone and thus stagnating further integration.  Banús Vidal  (2007, 51) notes, “in 
order to be successful, an extremely high level of affinity and trust between the Latin 
American governments” must exist.  This level of trust and affinity does not seem to be 
very high between some Latin American countries, as land grabs, territorial disputes, and 
general competition among the states for access to resources have been common 
throughout South American independent history.  For example, the on-going dispute 
between Venezuela and Colombia recently provoked Venezuela to send troops to its 
border with Colombia, thereby increasing the already tense relationship (Margolis 2009, 
6). 
Another major challenge to the viability of UNASUR is the “terrible asymmetry 
between the productive capabilities of the Andean countries and the Southern Cone 
countries” (Hidalgo Martinez 2007, 51).  The two regions have vastly differing industrial 
structures and economic capabilities, which will be a hurdle to reconcile in the future.  
Although UNASUR is still in its infancy and is still a credible and legitimate effort, as it 
seeks to combine the two existing customs unions (Mercosur and the Andean 
Community), each bringing its own set of problems and issues, UNASUR faces many 
challenges in becoming a viable and successful regional integration effort.   
All four of these organizations (Mercosur, the Andean Community, the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Americas, and the Union of South American Nations) exist concurrently 
at the moment.  The latest example of regional integration efforts in the region was 
created the 23rd of February, 2010, when the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States was established.  Hennigan (2010) notes, “It is the latest example of a 
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decade-long drive within the Americas to deepen continental integration and lessen the 
once overwhelming influence of the United States on politics and economics.” Mexican 
President Felipe Calderón noted that the newly established organization “will consolidate 
and globally project a new Latin American and Caribbean identity” (quoted in Rodriguez 
2010). The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was created with the 
intention of providing a forum for developing countries’ issues and will not replace any 
of the already existing regional organizations.  The formal establishment of the new 
organization is to be carried out in July 2011. 
Although not all of these regional integration efforts have been successful, each of 
these examples shows a continuous, region-wide desire for regional cooperation and 
integration. Although many Latin American and specifically South American regional 
integration attempts have existed, the viability and success of these integration efforts is 
dependent on the events, conflicts, and debates occurring at the national level of the 
countries involved.   In recent years, Bolivia has experienced dramatic changes within 
state and civil society, including the change of power through six Presidents in fifteen 
years, major protests, such as the 2000 Cochabamba Water War and the 2003 Gas War 
that gained international coverage, and the rise of popular based political parties such as 
the Movimiento al Socialismo.  The historical background of Bolivia within this context 
and within a cultural and political ecology framework, is especially helpful in 
understanding Bolivia’s role in these regional integration efforts. 
Bolivia within this context 
 Bolivia has a high population of indigenous peoples, the major groups being the 
Quechua and the Aymara (Davis and Harrison 2007).  Bolivia is estimated to have the 
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fourth largest indigenous population in Latin America (Vanden and Prevost 2009, 84).  
As a percentage of population, Bolivia has the highest among all the Latin American 
countries (Vanden and Prevost 2009, 84).  As mentioned previously, in Bolivia, more 
than approximately sixty percent of the population self identifies as indigenous (Albo 
2008). 
  Like in many of the Andean states, the elite criollo and mestizo groups of Bolivia 
have long dominated the state and society. Until the first decade of the 2000s, the 
majority of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia were largely segregated from direct 
participation in the national government, the formal economy, and mainstream society 
(Albo 2008).  As a result of this historic segregation of the majority of the Bolivian 
population, and the many challenges this created in the process of nation building, 
Bolivia has experienced a very volatile history, full of revolutions, social unrest, and 
dramatic regime changes (Grindle and Domingo 2003).2   Crabtree and Whitehead (2008) 
attribute the continuous resistance and conflict in the Bolivian state and society to many 
factors including Bolivia’s struggling political system, the many legacies of colonial rule, 
including the mining and latifundio legacies, and as well as continuous conflicts over 
ethnicity, identity, and inclusion.   
 The political setup of the Bolivian state has been called a “Swiss cheese state” as 
it is a state that governs heavily in certain areas (urban) and very lightly in other (rural) 
areas (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008, 4). As a result of this “Swiss Cheese state,” in 
certain areas (specifically rural areas), social and political groups have had the 
opportunity to develop and organize grassroots organizations, largely unnoticed by the 
                                                 
2
 Bolivia has had over 100 revolutions in its independent history (Armstrong 2007). 
 29
central government (Crabtree and Whitehead 2008, 4).  The legacies of colonial rule, 
including mestizaje and the subsequent social stratification of Bolivian society, and the 
forced labor institution of pongeaje on haciendas throughout Bolivia, have led to uneven 
development between the highlanders (kollas) and lowlanders (kambas), between urban 
and rural areas, between rich and poor sectors of society, as well as between mestizos, 
criollos, and indigenas (Klein 2003).34  
Crabtree and Whitehead (2008) also attribute the continuous conflict in Bolivian 
state and society to the complex notion of ethnicity that is present in Bolivia. To give an 
idea of this ethnic diversity, in the January 2009 Constitution, thirty-eight languages, 
along with Spanish, are included as national languages of the Bolivian state (Gobierno 
Boliviano 2009).  See Figure 3 for an illustration of the ethnic diversity of Bolivia. 
 Spanish colonization of South America and the subsequent mixing of Spanish 
colonizers with indigenous peoples, and later with imported African slaves, made the 
social situation in Bolivia quite complex. As discussed previously, conflicts over 
ethnicity and identity began early on due to the Spanish (and continued with the Bolivian 
national government’s) policy of assimilation and mestizaje.   Calderón (1977, 190) 
argues “the entry of the Aymara and Quechuas into the colonial system began their 
twofold subjection, as peasants and as Indians.” 
 
                                                 
3
 During the colonial era, and after independence, pongueaje or “personal service obligation” was 
required of many Andean Indians to the owners of haciendas (Klein 2003, 233).   
4
 To give an overview of the social stratification in Latin American colonial society:  At the top 
of this hierarchy were those born in Spain (peninsulares); Under them were those of Spanish 
descent born in the Americas (criollos); Below were those of mixed Spanish and Indian blood 
(mestizos); Under them were those mixed mestizo and Spanish descent (castizos); the Indian 
population (indigenas) were on the lower end of the socio-economic ladder, just above the blacks 
(negros).  Source: Burkholder and Johnson (2001, 198-207). 
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Figure 3.  Map of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia (Source: La Razón 2008). 
Albo (2008, 18) argues that during the Republican period, after 1825, the 
“asymmetric dualism of colonial society persisted and in some respects became even 
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more pronounced with the advent of republican neocolonialism.”   By “asymmetric 
dualism,” Albo (2008, 18) is referring to the dualing identities that Bolivian indigenous 
people took on after the mestizaje process was initiated- that of being an indigena (person 
of indigenous descent) as well as a campesino (rural peasant).5  Calderón (1977, 200) 
concurs with Albo, arguing that during the Republican period “the problem continued to 
worsen, and social reintegration was not feasible in a dependent, under-developed 
economy.”   In fact, the indigenous peoples of Bolivia were not actively incorporated into 
Bolivian state and society until the state needed soldiers to fight against Paraguay in the 
Chaco War (1932-1935) (Klein 1992).  Even then, not all indigenous people were 
recognized as citizens, only those who had fought in the war. 
As a result of this situation, the Bolivian state has been plagued by persistent 
asymmetries, including the lack of political representation and participation of the 
majority of the population, and disparities in access to wealth, education, and state 
resources. The subordination of indigenous peoples in Bolivia by the dominant elite 
culture continued into the late twentieth century, until the recent mobilization of 
indigenous political groups.  Even the 1952 National Revolution6 did not fix these 
societal structural problems.   
                                                 
5
 Furthermore, dualism has another connotation within the Andean context- that is that many indigenous 
people still live by dualing social structures (Astvaldsson 2000).  On the one hand, many indigenous 
Bolivians still live their daily lives guided by the indigenous social system they grew up with in the rural 
areas of Bolivia, guiding spiritual and daily life, through daily customs, dress, language, belief system, etc. 
(Astvaldsson 2000).  On the other hand, many indigenous Bolivians have moved to urban or peri-urban 
areas (such as El Alto) where they have adapted to the national culture, adopting new forms of dress, 
castellano (or Spanish as the national tongue), and new values (Goodale 2006).   
 
6
 The Bolivian National Revolution was in large part provoked by the long established agricultural system 
(latifundia) that kept the majority of the Bolivian population from owning, farming, or working land. In 
April 1952 the Bolivian state collapsed and the civilian militia groups disarmed the army and armed the 
masses, in essence provoking a “massive social revolution”  (Klein 1992, 232).  
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In fact, the National Revolution further complicated Bolivian citizens’ notions of 
identity.  Albo (2008, 21) argues, “The 1952 state deprived people of their originario 
identity, this being the necessary price for achieving full citizenship.” Albo (2008, 21) 
further notes, “the ideal of the 1952 state was to build a society that was more inclusive, 
but also more homogeneous, through the adoption of mestizo culture.”   Although the 
largely excluded indigenous peoples of Bolivia were finally officially recognized by the 
Bolivian state as citizens, the indigenous classification was replaced with an emphasis on 
class identity as campesinos (peasants).   
Although the 1952 National Revolution, in theory, granted citizenship to all 
Bolivians, or rather, recognized all Bolivians as citizens for the first time, the other 
policies of the Revolution further isolated and subordinated certain sectors of the 
population.  The major policy change provoked by the 1952 National Revolution was the 
1953 Agrarian Reform Law, which on the one hand, redistributed land (Calderón 1977) 
but on the other hand, had uneven consequences for the country.  Major changes (in 
terms of land owning and land use) had occurred throughout rural Bolivia, while little 
changed within the cities.  Calderón (1977, 208) discusses how this “led to substantial 
changes in the countryside and to a very unbalanced development of the agrarian 
economy: dynamic growth in the east, near stagnation in the valleys and altiplano.”  
Calderón (1977, 208) goes on to add that the National Revolution realized “some degree 
of national unity” but at the same time, differences between the highlands and the 
lowlands grew, as well as those between urban and rural areas. This furthered the 
competition over state resources and animosity between the lowlanders (kambas) and 
highlanders (kollas). 
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 The 1952 Revolution raised expectations with the recognition of all Bolivians as 
citizens.  As a result of the subsequent disappointment following the lofty ideals of the 
Revolution, Albo (2008, 22) argues that since the 1952 Revolution, a “reemergence of 
identity” has gradually occurred.  This reemergence of identity first started with the 
Aymara and peasant based Katarista movements of the 1960s and later in the trade unions 
(miners and coca growers) of the 1970s and 1980s (Klein 1992). 
 The Katarista movement in the 1960s through the 1970s was the “first real 
expression of this new spirit” of indigenous identity (Albo 2008, 22).  Katarismo 
“implied going beyond the “short memory” that extended no further than the 1953 
Agrarian Reform Law.  In its place, it invoked a long memory that harked back to the 
(neo) colonial state” and the subjugation of indigenous peoples since the time of 
colonization (Albo 2008, 22-23).  
 During the 1970s and 1980s, a mass migration from the rural altiplano to the 
cities (El Alto, La Paz) and to the Chapare region of Cochabamba followed the tin crisis 
of 1985 and the massive layoffs in the state mining industry (Sullivan 1994).  Migrants to 
El Alto were mostly of Aymaran descent and as a consequence, Aymaran social 
movements as well as political parties emerged in El Alto and La Paz (Sullivan 1994).  
Migrants to the Chapare region were of both Quechua and Aymara descent, but took on 
more of the Quechua traditions, language, and identity (Sullivan 1994).  As a result of 
this migration, many of these indigenous migrants diffused their dualing social structures, 
as well as indigenous political organizations and trade unions.   
 Those who had migrated to the cities had another source of frustration- their past 
rural ethnic identity vs. their recently acquired mestizo, nationally educated, urban, 
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Bolivian identity.  In general, people possess many identities (such as occupational, 
gender, class, etc.).  In terms of identities, as Canessa (2007, 150) notes, “these recent 
migrants or children of migrants live between the Aymara-speaking agricultural world of 
their parents and grandparents dominated by community life and ritual, and the Spanish 
speaking world of schooled, but underemployed people struggling to make a living.”  
Much like Chicanos in the United States, they were not truly recognized by either group – 
the rural indigenous communities, or by the urban mestizo middle class and criollo elite.  
This lack of identification with the larger state created two challenges for the Bolivian 
regime- legitimacy of the state and cohesion of the nation.   
This lack of acceptance and identification with the larger Bolivian state and 
society provided even more reason for the political movements, trade unions such as the 
COB (Central Obrera Boliviana) and the CSUTCB (Confederacion Sindical Unica de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia), and other indigenous groups to further organize, 
mobilize, and gather political support (Healey 2006).  This, coupled with de-
militarization of the Bolivian state in the late 1970s, led to an increase in Katarista 
(Aymara) and other indigenous based trade unions and movements, such as the miners 
and coca growers union, in urban areas during the 1980s and 1990s (Crabtree and 
Whitehead 2008).  By the 1990s, the Katarista groups “were increasingly organizing not 
only as peasants, miners, and coca growers, but as indigenous people” (Canessa 2007, 
151).  The use of ethnic identity helped to transcend individual and cultural differences 
(especially between the Aymara and Quechua, who traditionally loathed one another) and 
to consolidate indigenous support (Calderón 1977).   
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In the case of many indigenous groups, ethnic identity becomes a means of 
power, which the groups then use to negotiate political objectives, and both national and 
international support (De la Cadena 2005).  As Sullivan (1994, 37) notes “because they 
are discriminated against as Indians, the recovery and affirmation of indigenous identity 
becomes a strategy in the struggle for social justice.” The use of ethnic identity is a 
highly effective tool, much more so than just screaming “oppression.”  Hooker (2005, 
303) notes, “instead of making claims for group rights as an oppressed minority group, 
they have based their demands on their identity as distinct ‘peoples’ with inherent rights 
to the territories that they have inhabited prior to the arrival of the current states.”   This 
fact gave these groups legitimacy, something that severely challenged the Bolivian state. 
As Sullivan (1994, 36) states that “the new generation of indigenous movements 
perceived more intensely the exclusion and marginalization of Indian values, behavior, 
and forms of organization from the power structure of the elite minority.”  She adds “the 
new generation of Indians, who are mestizo-educated, fulfill military obligations, [and] 
are urbanized, perceived with increasing sensitivity the continuation of the same 
dominant oligarchical criollo ideology which has subordinated the indigenous Andeans 
since colonial times” (Sullivan 1994, 36).  This new understanding, combined with the 
use of ethnic identity as a cohesive factor among the diverse ethnic groups of Bolivia, 
paved the way for major changes in Bolivian state and society in the early 2000s. 
 At the same time that the indigenous groups were gaining political experience and 
national support, structural changes also allowed the political sphere to open up and the 
traditional political party system to fragment.  Van Cott (2003) and Domingo (2005) 
argue that because of the governmental reforms of the 1990s, in part, indigenous groups 
 36
have been allowed to participate.  First, the 1994 Law of Popular Participation helped 
transform the Presidential unitary system to a more decentralized system with local 
representation (Van Cott 2003).  Domingo (2005, 1733) argues that this “facilitated the 
incorporation of the (largely excluded) rural and indigenous population to political life 
and has included the legal recognition of indigenous communities.”  The change towards 
a decentralized governmental system helped decision-making powers to be granted to 
local authorities, thereby giving these local groups the experience and time to learn how 
to cooperate and govern (Van Cott 2003). 
Second, a shift in political actors gave the new indigenous groups an opportunity 
to participate in national politics (Van Cott 2003).   Domingo (2005, 1739) attributes this 
structural change, allowing the participation of the new ethnically based political parties 
such as the Movimiento al Socialismo, to a “multilayered process of democratization.” 
The traditional political parties (such as the MNR, MIR, and ADN), who largely served 
their own interests, lost much popular support and legitimacy during the 1990s.  The 
transformation in political space and actors helped these indigenous based groups to gain 
experience, support, and legitimacy.   
The third structural change that Van Cott (2003) notes is the United States 
interference in Bolivian affairs, through neoliberal policies, coca eradication programs, 
and verbally attacking Evo Morales in the early 2000s.  All these interferences in 
combination led to an increase in “nationalist sentiments” among Bolivians and to the 
erosion of legitimacy of the Sánchez de Lozada government, which had largely adopted 
all American policies (Van Cott 2003, 772).  
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The combination of these factors, first the indigenous use of ethnic identity as a 
form of power (and counter-power), second, the struggling Bolivian state (under the 
Sánchez de Lozada administration), and third, the increasing American presence in 
Bolivian affairs, made the situation right for a viable change in Bolivian state and society.  
Van Cott (2003, 768) notes that, “by the 2002 national elections, the indigenous 
movement had become one of them most dynamic and consolidated social movements in 
the country.”  This led to a dramatic change in the potential for new political parties in 
Bolivia, bringing the question of ethnicity to the forefront of Bolivian society and politics 
for the first time in centuries.   
Additionally, tapping into the national memories of the Bolivian state has turned 
into an effective tool in indigenous mobilization and popular support.  These groups have 
been effective in gaining nationwide support and attention because in part, they are 
tapping into the national Bolivian memory.  Historically, indigenous people are an 
integral part of the collective national memory of many Andean nation-states.  As Hooker 
(2005, 301) notes, “national ideologies in Latin America have in most cases envisioned 
the nation as the product of a mixing process that has often been portrayed as taking place 
exclusively between Spanish men and indigenous women, resulting in a predominately 
Spanish culture with some indigenous contributions.”  Hooker (2005, 301) further adds, 
“in such cases, indigenous people occupy a certain place in the national symbolic 
universe as ancestral contributors to the new, hybrid mestizo nation and culture, even if 
they are seen as marginal and traditional in the present.”  In Bolivia, although the 
majority of the indigenous population had long been excluded from state and society, this 
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population still fulfilled an important role in the Bolivian national memory, and thus were 
an integral part of the Bolivian national identity.    
Once indigenous groups realized this, they were able to benefit from their integral 
role in the national memory.  Consequently, they also were able to gain support from a 
wide section of the population. Most importantly, as Canessa (2007, 151) notes “the 
emergence of [and mobilization around] new kinds of indigenous identity was one of a 
number of factors that combined to expose the weakness of the state and the political 
party system, leading to increasingly outright challenge to the state.” The culmination of 
these efforts can be seen in the election of the first indigenous Bolivian President in 2005, 
Evo Morales, “the first Bolivian President to win an absolute majority since electoral 
democracy was reinstated in 1982” (Healey 2006, 2).7  Morales was re-elected on 6 
December 2009, where he again won by a landslide (El País 2009).8  
Conclusion 
Part of understanding the viability of South American regional integration efforts 
depends on the viability of national integration of the nation-states involved in these 
efforts. Until the beginning of the 2000s, Bolivia was a highly divided country, with the 
society stratified along socio-economic, geographic, as well as ethnic lines.   A historic 
mistrust still existed between the Bolivian people and the government.  The economy was 
in shambles after neoliberal policies, implemented in the 1990s and early 2000s, cut 
welfare funding and privatized national assets.  After implementing these policies, the 
                                                 
7
 Morales obtained 53.7% of the vote in December 2005.  (Source: Vanden and Prevost 
2009, 589). 
8
 Morales obtained 62.1% of the vote in December 2009.  (Source: El País, 2009). 
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Bolivian state in the 1990s and early 2000s seriously lacked legitimacy among the 
population.  The country continued to lack a strong and cohesive national identity.    
In terms of regional integration, the citizens of a country lacking a strong national 
identity may be more willing to transcend the national level and join in a supranational 
organization.  If this is the case, then Bolivians might be more willing to sacrifice certain 
elements of national sovereignty and identity in return for increased regional integration, 
than say a country that possesses a more cohesive or strong national identity (think 
Argentina).  As a result of these recent structural, political, and social changes within 
Bolivia, it is likely that Bolivians’ sense of personal as well as national identity has been 
altered. At the same time as these changes have occurred, as discussed previously, 
various regional integration efforts have gained momentum, perhaps also influencing 
Bolivian national identity.  It is this complex relationship between increased regional 
integration and the recent history of Bolivia that will be analyzed in this investigation.  In 
order to carry out a thorough investigation, it is now necessary to review the pertinent 
literature on identity, national identity, regional integration, and identity politics within 
the Latin American context.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 
 
 In recent years, interest has shifted from a class-based framework during the Cold 
War to a growing field of research on ethnic, fractured, hybrid, and multiple identities in 
Latin America (Anderson 2006).  In part due to an increase in geographical works by 
cultural and political ecologists such as Peet and Watts (1996), Bebbington (2008), and 
Robbins (2004), another one of the reasons behind this dramatic increase in interest and 
research on Latin American identity, as Hale (1997) mentions, is that indigenous 
uprisings and political movements have become influential players in many nation-states 
in Latin America, including Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, and Bolivia.  To 
fully understand the current situation in Bolivia and to carry out a thorough academic 
investigation on the recent changes in Bolivian identity, it is necessary to first review the 
pertinent literature on identity, national identity, Latin American national identity, and the 
ways in which identity is used for political or social objectives, or identity politics.  As 
regional integration efforts have increased in the past few years in Latin America, it is 
also necessary and important to review the scant literature that does discuss this 
relationship between regional integration and changes in national identity.  
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Studies on Identity 
 Healey (2006, 4) defines identity as “a sense of belonging that derives from 
shared origins or characteristics.”  Religion, gender, occupation, class, geographic region 
as well as ethnicity are generally important parts of one’s identity (Smith 1991).   
Historically, identity has been portrayed as a simple concept (Healey 2006).  However, 
identity is a highly contested, complex subject that greatly depends on the conditions of 
time, space, audience, and purpose of such identity (Jackson and Warren 2005).  Jackson 
and Warren (2005, 561) note, “identities are not just fluid, not just multiple, they are 
fluidly multiple and always relational” to time, location, and to other actors.  Identity is 
also situational, meaning that people use their levels of identity in differing situations for 
diverse reasons and/or objectives.  Goodale (2006, 641) argues that “one’s identity is 
defined by a series of constituent (sub) identities; each sub identity is distinct from the 
other” and is utilized for a differing objective with various audiences.   One’s identity, 
therefore, is not defined by one single attribute.  Instead, as Smith (1991, 4) argues, “the 
self is composed of multiple identities and roles, familial, territorial, religious, ethnic, and 
gender.”   
 Smith’s last statement shows that identities may be personal, or collective which 
involves a group uniting together over shared histories or common characteristics.  
Collective identities can be subdivided down into ethnic collective identities (such as the 
Aymara or Quechua in the Bolivian case) as well as civic collective identities, mostly 
called national identities, based on responsibilities and common characteristics tied to the 
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state (Smith 1991).  As Smith (1991, 13) notes, “Every nationalism contains civic and 
ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms.”   
 The interest in collective identity in Latin America has grown since 1980 for 
various reasons. Throughout the region, dramatic economic, political and social changes 
have occurred, including de-militarization, the re-democratization of many countries, and 
the growth of social and identity based movements.  New forms of collective identity, 
both ethnic and civic, have emerged including the international environmental movement, 
indigenous movements, micro-banks, and Okupas (modern day squatters in Spain and 
Latin America).  
 Many of the recent social movements in Latin America are largely based on 
shared identities, such as ethnicity, rights to territory, class, occupation, and 
socioeconomic status.  And with the new forms of collective identity comes increased 
interest in “group agency and political action” (Cerulo 1997, 386).  Although many 
scholars have researched how these movements have utilized these collective identities to 
obtain social, economic and political gains in recent years, the study of the use of identity 
as a political device is nothing new.  Scholars, such as Anderson (2006), Deutsch (1963), 
Smith (1991) and Gellner (1994) have long investigated this phenomenon of identity (and 
collective identity) and its important relationship with the nation-state, as national 
identity.   
 Studies on National Identity 
 Since national identity and nationalism rose to direct global events (culminating 
in World War II), many scholars have explored these concepts.  Today, national identities 
are still a major guiding force in the international community and in nation-states’ 
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decision-making.  No study on national identity is complete without a review of the 
works of Ernest Gellner (1994), Karl Deutsch (1963), Anthony Smith (1991), Benedict 
Anderson (2006), and other scholars.   
Ernest Gellner’s (1994) work is especially important in understanding the rise of 
national identity and nationalism during European industrialization.  Using a Marxist 
framework, Gellner (1994) argues that national movements came about in part in 
combination with class-based movements.  He states, “it is only their conflation which 
does so, in the condition brought about by industrialism” (Gellner 1994, 197).  Although 
useful in understanding European industrialization, Gellner’s use of a Marxist framework 
to explain these phenomena has invited broad criticism from those trying to explain such 
concepts outside of Europe. This has been especially true since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.    
Moving beyond an ideological framework, Karl Deutsch’s (1963) early work on 
nation-building and national identity highlights the important role of a common language 
uniting the peoples of a nation.  Since the mid 1960s, other scholars have acknowledged 
Deutsch’s contribution and have attributed various other elements of national identity to 
be more important binding forces of nations.  In contrast to Deutsch’s (1963) emphasis 
on language as the binding force of a nation, Smith (1991) attributes it to the long 
memory of a location’s unique history and geography, as well as to the important role of 
national symbols in making people feel they are a part of the nation.  He argues,  
“In many ways, national symbols, customs and ceremonies are the most 
potent and durable aspects of nationalism.  They embody its basic 
concepts, making them visible and distinct for every member, 
communicating the tenets of an abstract ideology in palpable, concrete 
terms that evoke instant emotional responses from all strata of the 
community” (Smith 1991, 77).   
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Smith further adds, “By means of the ceremonies, customs, and symbols every 
member of a community participates in the life, emotions, and virtues of that community” 
(1991, 78).   Symbols play an important role in creating and sustaining sentiments of 
national identity and a feeling of belonging to the nation.   
 A major theorist in this field of identity, Anthony Smith (1991) discusses national 
identity and nationalism, however, in a very general sense.  Although he studies the 
phenomenon of national identity rather than individual national identities, Smith does 
acknowledge the differences in national identities and the limitations to an overarching, 
general theory explaining all national identities and nationalisms.  Umut Özkirimli (2000, 
61) follows this same line of thought, “arguing that no single, universal theory of 
nationalism is possible” even though “some scholars continue to espouse the view that 
the best way to deal with nationalism is to develop typologies.  In their view, nationalism 
is a chameleon-like phenomenon, capable of assuming a variety of ideological forms.”   
 With the increased specialization of the field of national identity and nationalism 
(with new topics such as migration, multicultural identities, hybrid identities, ethnic 
conflict, etc.) in recent years, Özkirimli (2006) argues that no overarching theory can 
cover all these identities. One reason no overarching theory can encompass all the diverse 
notions of national identities is due to the diversity of local factors that influence national 
identities.  Furthermore, due to the wide-ranging types of national identities and 
nationalisms present in the world, Özkirimli (2000, 61) concludes that, “it is not possible 
to account for all these variations in a single ‘grand’ theory.”  
Another reason that no overarching theory can exist is due to what Scott (1963, 
77) calls the “problem of identity,” noting that “the lack of any strong sense of personal 
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identity” creates diverse needs for a larger collective identity.  And collective identities 
depend on local factors and desires.  Francis Fukuyama (2006) argues that the other 
problem with identity is the desire to be recognized.  To some degree, every human 
strives to be recognized (Fukuyama 2006).  Smith (1991, 177) argues,  
“until these needs are fulfilled through other kinds of identification, the 
nation with its nationalism, denied or recognized, oppressed or free, each 
cultivating its own distinctive history, its golden ages and sacred 
landscapes, will continue to provide humanity with its fundamental 
cultural and political identities well into the next century.”  
 
 
Of all the ways that humans identify themselves (religion, gender, class, ideology, 
geography, etc.), Smith (1991, 175) argues, “national identity does in fact today exert a 
more potent and durable influence than other collective cultural identities.” Every day 
events in the international community still portray the wide array of independent 
interests, agendas, needs and desires of nation-states around the world.   
 Studies on Latin American National Identity 
 Benedict Anderson (2006) is one of the few major theorists of national identity 
and nationalism that directly discusses the unique nature of Latin American national 
identity.  Other scholars, such as Gellner, Smith, and Deutsch do not directly address 
Latin America and rather just apply over-arching national identities theories to this 
region. Anderson (2006) notes that Latin America historically lacked a middle class.  
Although Latin America boasts its share of class based movements historically and now, 
according to Anderson, Ernest Gellner’s explanation of national identity formation does 
not hold true in the Latin American case. The Latin American colonial experience 
produced far different social structures than in Europe, which influenced later national 
identity formation in Latin America. 
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 Anderson (2006, 50) points out the irony of the process of creating national 
identities in Latin America with one question: “why did such colonial provinces, usually 
containing large, oppressed, non-Spanish speaking populations, produce creoles who 
consciously redefined these populations as fellow-nationals?”  In addition to this irony, 
Anderson attributes this difference to the role of foreigners in nation-building in Latin 
America, including the impact of clergy and the influx of immigrants to the Americas.  
He also highlights the importance of local newspapers in making unique Mexican, 
Chilean, Argentine, etc. experiences out of regional events (Anderson 2006, 63).  Similar 
to Deutsch, Anderson (2006) emphasizes the role that language plays in uniting groups of 
people and in building cohesive national identities.     
 Although Latin American countries share a common history and many colonial 
legacies, Whitaker and Jordan (1966) argue that national identity and nationalism within 
the region are not monolithic or static overtime.  Many scholars, such as Brown (2006), 
López- Alves (2000), Burkholder and Johnson (2001), and Boyer and Spurling (2000) 
have researched the creation of national identities in Latin America. Boyer and Spurling 
(2000, 1) analyze historic colonial Latin American documents “which give vivid 
glimpses of the profound impact of economics, ecological, religious, and cultural 
processes” of colonial life.  In doing so, Boyer and Spurling use primary documents to 
understand Latin American identity formation during the colonial period.  In contrast, 
Burkholder and Johnson (2001) document the economic, political, social, and territorial 
changes in colonial Latin American society and how these changes in turn influenced 
notions of regional as well as later, national identities.   
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 Moving outside the colonial period, López- Alves (2000) discusses the process of 
state formation throughout Latin America.  He explains that individual national identities 
grew out of the unique historic experiences and ethnic makeup of each Latin American 
nation-state.  Conversely, Brown (2006), like Anderson (2006) places emphasis on the 
role of foreigners (immigrants, merchants, clergy, soldiers, etc.) in the creation of 
individual Latin American national identities.  Brown argues these foreigners (such as 
immigrants, clergy, soldiers, and merchants) provided a sense of “other” for Latin 
Americans and served as an important and influential factor in the nation-building 
process.  Brown (2006) also suggests that nationalism in Latin America has long grown 
in relation to desires for economic development, a point other scholars such as Whitaker 
and Jordan (1966) and Masur (1966) also make. 
Guibernau and colleagues (2006) address the various forms of nationalisms and 
national identities present in Latin America today.  They emphasize a point that was 
already highlighted by Miller (2006) and Brown (2006)- that is that Latin American 
states have established and developed national identities in a far different way than, say, 
Europe or other parts of the developing world.  Guibernau, et al. (2006, 199) note, “the 
region has a long history of thinking differently about nationalism, and merits closer 
attention than it has often received from theoreticians of nationalism.”   
Additionally, Guibernau and colleagues (2006) provide a review of the latest and 
newest types of investigations on Latin American identities.   For example, much like 
Deutsch (1963) and Anderson (2006), Miller (2006) discusses the role of language in the 
formation of national identity.  In the Latin American case, where an overarching 
language (Spanish and Portuguese) was established during the colonial period, Miller 
 48
(2006, 203) argues that “the incorporation of vocabulary, inflections, and rhythms from 
indigenous languages… has also been significant in developing a sense of national 
distinctiveness.”  Not only does Miller’s statement suggest that language has been an 
integral force in binding Latin Americans together, it also implies that individual 
countries within Latin American have attempted to differentiate themselves through 
dialect.   
Another example of a recent investigation on identity in Latin America is the 
work of Valéria Salgueiro (2006), who researches the role of public architecture and its 
influence (as visual representations of the state) on the creation of Brazilian national 
identity.  Additionally, Escolar, Quintero Palacios, and Reboratti (1994) address the role 
of political geography in the formation of Argentine national identity.  They define 
national community as any nation that possesses an identity and a territory, thus tying 
geography to the foundation of national identity (Escolar, et al. 1994).   
In reviewing the history of national identity and nationalism, other than Benedict 
Anderson (2006), Miller (2006, 203) notes that, “few of the major theorists and 
comparative historians of nationalism have said much about Latin America.  Leaders in 
the field… have either ignored Latin America altogether or relegated it to an uneasy 
footnote, acknowledging that it does not really ‘fit’ any of their schemas.”  One reason 
that Latin America is rarely included in the major theorist’s ideas is because of the early 
independence movement of Latin America, compared to other former colonial holdings. 
Brown (2006, 224) also notes, “the early independence of Spain’s continental American 
colonies in 1810-1830 is rarely integrated into overarching theories of the birth of 
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modern nations, which tend to focus on earlier developments in Europe and later 
decolonization in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere.” 
Another likely reason that Latin America did not fit in to these categories of 
nationalisms and national identities is due to the colonial legacy of mestizaje or the 
mixing of races, that occurred early on in Iberian colonization and the subsequent social 
stratification that continues to this day throughout Latin America (De la Cadena 2005).  
The mixing of indigenous peoples with Iberian colonists and imported African slaves 
throughout Latin America means that instead of a national identity within one country, 
there are many national identities in said country, depending on the individual 
background, socioeconomic status, race, ethnicity, heritage, experiences, etc.  Although 
often portrayed simplistically, Latin America poses a much more complicated field of 
research in national identities than previously thought.   
Miller and Brown’s statements indicate a need for more research on the varying 
forms and degrees of identity in Latin America. Since Latin America has largely been 
skipped over or over-arching theories have been applied monolithically to the region by 
the major national identity and nationalism scholars, other more regionally based scholars 
(Latin Americanists) along with political ecologists (Bebbington 2008, Rocheleau and 
colleagues 2001, Keeling 2004, Perrault 2001) have filled in the gaps in this literature on 
individual national identities.   In short, regional scholars have produced works on the 
diverse types of national identities and nationalisms in Latin America (Hooson 1994, 
Dijkink 1996).  However, few scholars have produced much work on the recent changes 
in national identity in Bolivia, a country that has long been understudied (Morales 2009). 
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Studies on Bolivian National Identity 
Bolivian national identity evolved by mixing elements of Quechua, Aymara, and 
other native groups’ culture with the imposed characteristics of Iberian culture.  Inherent 
in any discussion of Bolivian identity is the notion of ethnicity (Morales 2009).  Albo 
(2008) contends that although there are fuzzy boundaries surrounding ethnicity in 
general, it is especially pronounced in Bolivia.  As Masur (1966, 93) concurs, noting “the 
Andean bloc presents a mosaic of problems, largely due to its ethnic structure.”  He 
further notes, “if a nation is composed of people who communicate with each other more 
intensely than with others, Bolivia cannot be called a nation before the twentieth century” 
(Masur 1966, 110).  From independence throughout the Republican period, the diverse 
ethnic and linguistic makeup was a challenge in Bolivia because of the plethora of 
languages that are spoken in the region (Masur 1966).  In fact, use of a common language 
in Bolivia to unify the diverse country proved problematic until the mid 1970s.  Klein 
(1992, 265) notes, “finally, the percentage of Spanish speakers had risen to such an extent 
that by 1976, it was finally to become the majority language of Bolivia for the first time 
in republican history.”   This statement suggests that Bolivia was not a cohesive state 
until the late twentieth century, when it finally achieved a common language. 
Although elements of the indigenous cultures were used to create a Bolivian 
national identity, indigenous people themselves have largely been excluded from this 
Bolivian national identity.   Whitaker and Jordan (1966) note that Bolivian national 
identity originated from a complex and chaotic history, one that fostered ethnic strife and 
territorial losses.  Furthermore, they argue that Bolivia’s role as an exporter economy in 
the international community invited foreign interference in Bolivian economic and 
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political affairs, a common thread that has, historically, provided power to unite this 
diverse country.   As a result of this messy history, in Bolivia, national identity evolved to 
take the form of “revolutionary nationalism,” a form of patriotism based on the political 
party Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario and its first leader, Victor Paz Estenssoro 
(Whitaker and Jordan 1966, 139).   
Historically, the Bolivian criollo elites have used foreign ideas in combination 
with Bolivian national identity to obtain and to further economic and political objectives.  
As Whitaker and Jordan (1966, 5) note, “Nationalism is a tool and the things we need to 
know about it are who uses it, and why, how, and with what results.”  This manipulation 
of Bolivian national identity began when Bolivia was first exposed to the world market, 
fulfilling the position of an exporter economy.  Calderón (1977, 204) argues, 
 “The crisis of the enclave economy induced a profound crisis in the 
political power structure, which led in turn to a readjustment of the class 
structure and of the political representation of the various classes and 
social strata.  This in turn involved the basic question of national unity 
with nationalism and socialism as ideological and political alternatives.”   
 
Since independence, crises in the Bolivian political structure have been 
commonplace.  Thus, national identity and nationalism were created by Bolivian elites in 
response to these potential threats.   The problem with this situation, as Sullivan (1994) 
notes, is that the majority of the population was excluded from this national identity.  
This exclusion of the majority of the population further negated the state’s legitimacy.   
Changes in the late 1990s and early 2000s in both Bolivian state and society have 
attempted to address these issues.  The 2005 election of an indigenous President, who 
also won the highest percentage of votes since Bolivia’s return to democracy in 1982, 
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shows a widespread desire to change the course of Bolivia’s future.  Canessa (2007, 146) 
notes:  
“Evo Morales’ election represents profound and dramatic changes in the 
social and political landscape of Bolivia. It is a major change in how state 
power is wielded in a county where whites, be they Spanish colonists or 
their Creole descendants, have ruled over a majority of indigenous 
population for five centuries.”   
 
Canessa (2007, 146) argues that such dramatic political change also “has consequences 
for peoples’ sense of who they are as Bolivians and as indigenous people.”  These 
changes, coupled with the mass migration of Bolivians to urban areas during the late 
1980s and 1990s, have transformed Bolivians’ sense of identity.  As Albo (2008, 32-33) 
states,  
“The net effect of this is that the majority of those defining themselves as 
belonging to indigenous groups now live in urban areas.  To some extent, 
therefore, the strength of migratory flows shifts the rural-versus-urban 
contradiction to one of rural plus impoverished and ethnically defined 
urban peripheries versus wealthier, more central, and criollo urban areas.”   
  
Goodale (2006) provides an excellent example of this change in locals’ 
conceptions of identity.  Some scholars such as Lazar (2008) and Read (2008) note that 
El Alto, sitting just above La Paz, is the largest indigenous city in the Western 
hemisphere.  Through rap music, the Aymara and Quechua youth in El Alto have 
connected with the global rap scene and have transcended their society to bring the 
problems of the indigenous majority to the forefront of Bolivian society (Goodale 2006). 
The young rappers are integrated in the global rap scene, as are the various Aymara and 
Quechua groups included in other international organizations such as environmental, 
anti-globalization, and class based movements.  The local rappers are all accepted at a 
local level among most other indigenous peoples in El Alto and La Paz.   
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Yet, historically these Aymara and Quechua rappers, and other indigenous 
peoples in Bolivia, have been excluded from participating in national politics or society.  
By combining ethnic identity with new forms of inclusion through rap, technology, and 
education, many indigenous groups have made the problems of Bolivian society 
understandable to people who normally would not be able to participate (Goodale 2006).  
Through that understanding, a broad swath of the population, who previously did not 
participate in national political discourse are changing the way politics is conducted in 
Bolivia.  This evolution has created “fractured” identities in Bolivia, where at one scale 
one’s identity is fully accepted and embraced (Haraway (1994, 196), Goodale (2006)).  
Yet, on another scale, in another situation, in front of a different audience, one’s identity 
is not recognized.  This has recently provoked changes in Bolivian national identity, 
something that has always matured in relation to a wider Latin American regional 
identity.  
Studies on Latin American Regional Identity 
 Commonly referred to as hispanoamericanismo, “continental nationalism,” or 
Pan-Latin Americanism, many scholars, such as Masur (1966, 68) and Whitaker and 
Jordan (1966), argue that a Latin American regional identity has existed since the 1820s.  
Although this common identity has lost ground to other identities, it is based on Iberian 
colonial legacies and other common characteristics of mutually intelligible languages 
(Spanish and Portuguese), religion (Catholicism), and the political (elitist) and economic 
(mercantilist) structures left by former Iberian colonial powers (De Soto 1989).  Other 
common historic and geographic factors also exist that tie the region together culturally. 
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  The Law of the Indies (1573) dominated much of the geographic and 
administrative details of Spanish colonization in the Americas (Nostrand 2001).  The 
Spanish precisely laid out the colonial towns, cities, and provinces, based on presidios 
(defensive fortresses), the Catholic Church, mitas (the mining tradition) and the rural 
social and economic institutions of latifundios and haciendas (Nostrand 2001).  
Throughout their colonies, from North America to Patagonia, Nostrand (2001) notes that 
the Spanish settlements were geographically very similar.  This similar geographic layout 
of the region made Latin America relatively homogeneous in the way the colonial 
government was spatially organized, how it conducted business, collected taxes, and how 
it was connected to other towns through the hierarchy between the colonial 
establishments.  Although obvious differences did occur, depending on the local physical 
and human geography of a place, as well as the influence (or lack thereof) of imported 
Africans and the indigenous peoples of the Americas, in terms of economic, political, and 
social systems, the Spanish governed the colonies extensively and somewhat cohesively 
(Nostrand 2001, Clawson 2006). 
 Additionally, as Spain had administered many regions of its South, Central, and 
North American colonies in geographically similar ways- first sorting the areas into 
regions as one large territory, such as the Viceroy of New Spain or the Viceroy of Peru, 
(which were then subdivided into audiencias and further into provincias)- the peoples of 
the newly founded South American countries possessed a natural inclination towards a 
larger regional entity (Burkholder and Johnson 2001).  This can be seen in the ideals of 
Símon Bolívar, the leader of some of the South American independence movements, who 
“attempted to create a new state of Gran Colombia, uniting Venezuela, New Granada, 
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and Ecuador” just after independence (Vanden and Prevost 2009, 46).  Having been part 
of a largely decentralized wider system, where all involved used the same trading 
networks, the same language, the same currency, etc., many of the nation-states of South 
America, unlike those of Europe, have had previous experience under a similar 
supranational situation.  In effect, the Law of the Indies provided a geographic 
commonality among most of the Iberian colonies.   
 Much like the Law of the Indies, another cultural similarity throughout the 
Spanish and Portuguese colonies was the process of mestizaje, or the mixing of peoples 
(De la Cadena 2005).  Mestizaje had a large impact on the subsequent subdivisions (both 
social and economic) of many Latin American nations (De la Cadena 2005).  In fact, 
mestizaje was one of the most culturally significant legacies of the Spanish and 
Portuguese colonial experience in the Americas because of the social stratification it 
produced.  As Burkholder and Johnson (2001, 204) note, “miscegenation among 
Spaniards, Indians, and Africans produced a large racially mixed stratum in colonial 
society.”  By mixing with indigenous peoples across the Americas, the Spanish in effect 
created a new caste of people, the mestizo (De la Cadena 2005).  In Bolivia, mestizaje 
(biologically) only influenced a small part of the population- the small group of elite 
criollos and mestizos.  However, in terms of social stratification and segregation, 
mestizaje greatly influenced the current complexity of ethnicity and identity in Bolivia. 
 Furthermore, by creating the caste-like system of mestizaje in Latin America and 
by consolidating all the diverse indigenous peoples into one group, “Indians” the Spanish 
in part homogenized these peoples and complicated people’s sense of self and identity 
(Sullivan 1994).  This notion of multiple identities, produced out of the social 
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stratification of Latin American society along with the exclusive political and economic 
systems discussed earlier, has since challenged the process of nation building throughout 
Latin America (Scott 1963).   
 Indeed, the main challenges in the Latin American process of nation building 
stem from colonial legacies.  As Scott (1963, 74) notes, 
“The Spanish and Portuguese empires were really little more than mirrors 
of the semi feudal and preindustrial mother countries, so that most of the 
same social and political factors which have impeded national integration 
on the Iberian peninsula have operated to delay nation-building during the 
nearly fifteen decades of independence enjoyed by most of the Latin 
American republics.”   
 
Since independence, some Latin American countries have struggled in establishing 
inclusive nation-states with cohesive national identities, always doing so in reference to 
this larger regional identity. As Miller (2006, 216) notes, Latin American “national 
identities have developed in complex relationship with a transnational regional identity- 
hispanoamericanismo- that has acted as a crucial reference of both sameness and 
difference and that has functioned as more of a complement to national identities than a 
competition to them.”  This context of colonial legacies and a regional identity left in 
place by the Portuguese, Spanish, and other European powers, provided commonalities 
that lead one to believe that the region would easily integrate economically and 
politically.  However, historic and cultural commonalities aside, as mentioned previously, 
the region has not had much success in integration to the level of a common market or an 
economic union to date. 
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Studies on Regional Integration and National Identity 
Many scholars have researched regional integration (Belassa 1961, Axline 1994, 
Coffey 1998, Grieco and Ikenberry 2003, and Spero and Hart 2003).   Using a basic 
economic rationale, Belassa (1961) maintains that nation-states integrate based on what a 
country can gain from such integration.  Likewise, Grieco and Ikenberry (2003) and 
Spero and Hart (2003) also follow this theoretical perspective, discussing the economic 
benefits behind regional cooperative agreements.   Axline (1994) takes a different 
perspective on regional integration, addressing more of the necessary requirements for 
successful regional cooperation including citizen participation.  
Other scholars, such as Cammack (1999), Cason and Burrell (2002), Di Filippo 
(2006), and Pion-Berlin (2000) have looked at the various efforts, both past and present, 
of regional integration in Latin America.  Pion-Berlin (2000) and Coffey (1998) argue 
that regional integration efforts in Latin America have been driven largely by the regional 
desire to develop economically.  In contrast, Cammack’s (1999) study on Mercosur 
highlights the reasons behind Mercosur’s establishment in 1991, including tying the 
Argentine and Brazilian domestic agendas to the wider regional economy.  Similarly, 
Cason and Burrell’s (2002) analysis helps to explain the recent events in Mercosur, 
looking at the role of domestic politics and society issues in the process of integration.  
Di Filippo (2006) argues that the best strategy for long term Latin American regional 
integration is to begin with South American regional integration, noting that this will only 
function if the corresponding nations of people across the continent participate in this 
process.   
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In short, many scholars have investigated the various levels, agreements, and 
issues involved in regional integration in general and more specifically in Latin America.  
Many intellectuals have assessed regional integration in Latin America and many others 
have investigated national identity in Latin America.  Few researchers, however, have 
looked at this crossroads between national identity and regional integration worldwide.  
Anthony Smith (1991) briefly addresses the notion of a larger collective identity based on 
the joining together of states.  Smith argues that national identities will always be of 
utmost importance to nations.  Therefore, a successful “Pan-nationalism” is that “which 
overarches but does not abolish individual nations” (1991, 175).  In Laura Cram’s 
(2009b) recent article “Identity and European integration: Diversity as a source of 
Integration,” the changes in national identities since the establishment of the European 
Union are discussed.   Tobias Theiler (2005) similarly addresses the formation of political 
identity within the context of expanding European regional integration.  Both authors 
suggest that instead of an overarching regional identity, what has occurred with increased 
European regional integration is the reinforcement of local (or sub-national) and national 
identities.   
Cram (2009b, 110) adds, “European integration facilitates the flourishing of 
diverse national identities rather than convergence around a single homogeneous 
European identity.”   This in part is due to the fact that a regional European identity has 
not historically held the region together.  Certainly, much of European culture is based on 
Greek and Roman legacies of democracy, Christianity, etc.  But the nations of Europe 
have long histories of fragmentation, conflict, and war.  As Smith (1995, 139- quoted in 
Cram 2009b, 113) notes, “without shared memories and meanings, without common 
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symbols and myths, without shrines and ceremonies and monuments, except bitter 
reminders of recent holocausts and wars, who will feel European in the depths of their 
being?”   Rather than converging around a European identity, this historical legacy, 
coupled with Union expansion, has reinforced European national and sub-national 
identities, as can be seen with, for example, the Catalonian and Basque identities in 
Spain.  
Although an evolving European identity has been studied widely, Cram (2009b, 
115) notes, “What has been less examined is the long term effect that this has had on 
national self perceptions and how these may have shifted overtime.”  In essence, more 
research is needed on how increased regional integration is affecting national and sub-
national identities. Furthermore, Cram (2009a, 107) argues, “the synergistic relationship 
between the European Union’s role in supporting, reinforcing, or even creating national 
identities, the process of European integration and the emergence of a European Union 
identity is under-researched.”   Cram’s article suggests that although the European Union 
has been around for nearly sixty years, few scholars have taken on the task of researching 
how national identities in Europe, with increased integration, have changed over time.   
 Furthermore, since regional integration in Latin America has existed for about the 
same length of time without the success of the European Union, far fewer researchers 
have looked at this relationship between national identity and regional integration in 
Latin America. Nicola Miller (2006) briefly reviews the history of this relationship in 
Latin America while Manuel Alcántara Sáez (2000) discusses the elite perspective on 
regional integration in Latin America.  Mitchell Seligson (1999) addresses the popular 
sentiment for regional integration across Latin America.  Seligson (1999, 131) notes, 
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“while European opinions on the EU have been extensively studied, far less is known, 
however, about other regional integration schemes.  With the exception of NAFTA, the 
role of public opinion in regional economic schemes in Latin America has been largely 
devoid of study.”   While both Seligson (1999) and Alcántara Sáez (2000) address Latin 
American sentiments about increased regional integration, neither addresses how 
increased regional integration is affecting identities (civic, national, collective), what 
consequences this will have on the individual nation-states and the larger regional 
integration efforts currently at play in the region, and whether these efforts are fostering a 
regional Latin American or South American identity.   
 At the same time that these regional integration efforts have matured, identities 
(civic, collective, national, occupational, ethnic) have increasingly become a political tool 
in many parts of the world.  Some of the most vocal groups have been based in Latin 
America, increasing academic interest in identity in the region.   Consequently, “identity 
politics” has taken on an increasingly important role in the analysis of recent social 
movements and changes in many societies across Latin America (Hale 1997, 568).  
Hale (1997, 568) defines identity politics as “the collective sensibilities and actions that 
come from a particular location within society, in direct defiance of universal categories 
that tend to subsume, erase, or suppress that particularity.”  Conversely, Jackson and 
Warren (2005, 554) call this the “politics of recognition” where “identity itself is turned 
into a strategy, a political opposition structure.”  Under the guise of many labels, identity 
has been turned into an effective political tool that indigenous, environmental, class based 
and other groups across Latin America have used to further their political objectives and 
to obtain opportunities to participate in and affect national politics (Hooker 2005).   
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Cultural and Political Ecology Studies on Identity Politics 
 Studies on identity politics and new social movements based on shared identities 
in Latin America have saturated much of the social science literature in recent years.  
The increase in the use of terms such as “hybridity” (Hale 1997, 569) multiple identities, 
“fractured identities” (Haraway 1994, 196), or dualing identities, shows this shift in the 
study of identity politics over the past fifteen years.  Social science scholars have 
produced recent works on these differing terms of Latin American identities: De La 
Cadena (2005) also explores the idea of hybridity, while Healey (2006), Sullivan (1994), 
Astvaldsson (2000), and Goodale (2006) all investigate the notion of Andean dualism.    
 Using cultural and political ecology as a guiding framework, geographers such as 
Peet and Watts (1996), Bebbington and Batterbury (2001), Perrault (2001), Jokisch 
(2002), Keeling (2004), Rocheleau and colleagues (2001), Robbins (2004), and 
Bebbington (2008) have produced much research on the recent changes in livelihoods 
and identities throughout the world.   Based on the human-environment interaction, 
transnational networks, and multi-scalar analysis, cultural and political ecology seeks to 
“explain livelihoods in terms of their relationships with these other transnational social 
spaces”  (Bebbington and Batterbury 2001, 374).  Geographers, combining the notions of 
space and place to complex transnational networks and subsequent changes in identities, 
have been especially prolific in the study of identity politics. 
 Cultural and political ecology has been an especially useful framework of analysis 
for studies on identity in Latin America, due to the historic study of transnational 
networks, multiple scales of analysis, as well as a focus on livelihoods and identities. 
Latin America in general, and the Andes more specifically, “with its peculiar history, is 
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in many ways one of the most globalized and integrated regions in the world” (Robbins 
2004, 191).  Due to its unique highland landscape, agricultural practices, and traditional 
cultures, with a long history of European resource exploitation and migration flows, the 
Andes are a region particularly apt for research in political ecology.  Furthermore, 
Robbins emphasizes that, “the region is also notable for the ways in which social 
movements and ethnic identity have been closely intertwined with changing crops, 
technology, and labor relations in the past few decades”  (Robbins 2004, 191).   
Many other scholars, such as Bebbington (2008), Bebbington and colleagues (2008), 
Becker (2004), Greene (2006), Jokisch (2002), and Perrault (2001), concur with Robbins 
and have produced recent works focusing on identity-based movements in the Andean 
region in particular. 
 In Latin America, as mestizaje included African, European, and Ameridian 
elements, the mixing of peoples subsequently produced complex notions of identity.  
Early on, the Spanish identified most Latin American indigenous groups as solely 
Indians, which partially stripped these people of their unique indigenous or ethnic 
identities, while people of mixed backgrounds (mestizos) faced other identity challenges, 
such as “fractured identities” (Haraway 1994, 196).  Jackson and Warren (2005) argue 
that fragmented identities were wrought from not really belonging to either the 
indigenous side or the Spanish criollo side. 
 In recent decades, Greene (2006) provides an example of fractured identities in 
the South American context.  He argues that in Peru, where indigenous movements have 
previously lacked any real significance at the national level, they have held great 
significance and influence in international movements, as well as among other 
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international actors (including the World Bank and the United Nations).  Greene (2006) 
argues that these groups were able to transcend their national governments and affect the 
international community by voicing common concerns about the Amazonian basin and its 
traditional peoples.  The use of their ethnic identities, tied to their natural environment 
(the Amazon) provided the reason that these groups were successful in gaining 
international support. 
 Identity politics and this local-global relationship that Greene (2006) highlights, 
are two subjects that have been well researched by cultural and political ecologists, such 
as Bebbington (2008), Rocheleau and colleagues (2001), Peet and Watts (1996), and 
Robbins (2004). By analyzing local adaptations to global forces, political ecology 
provides an alternative way to understand globalized relationships and explain the 
consequences they have on local landscapes and identities.  It is within this framework of 
cultural and political ecology where geographers have produced a substantial amount of 
work on identity in Latin America.  
Conclusion 
 With the exception of Benedict Anderson, many of the leading national identity 
scholars such as Deutsch (1963), Gellner (1994), Smith (1991), and Özkirmli (2000) have 
long skipped over fully explaining national identity in Latin America, as national 
identities in Latin America rarely fit into the scenarios of the prominent national identity 
theories.  In fact, geographers in general, and cultural and political ecologists in 
particular, have filled in many of the pre-existing gaps in the literature on changing 
identities within the Latin American context.  Moreover, few researchers, such as Cram 
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(2009b) and Miller (2006), have investigated the relationship between increased regional 
integration and national identities throughout the world.   
 These conditions serve as evidence that a need exists for more research on 
national identity in Latin America, especially within this context of increased regional 
integration. Using cultural and political ecology as a framework will allow this study to 
more aptly explore and understand the changes occurring in South America with regard 
to the ongoing regional integration process, and if this process is prompting any changes 
in allegiances and identities.  As the cultural and political ecology framework seeks 
understanding of phenomenon occurring on multiple scales and across vast transnational 
networks, it is especially apt for this study as allegiances to identity in any regional 
integration process are many, and exist on multiple scales (local, national, supranational, 
regional, etc.).   Furthermore, a cultural and political ecology framework in this study 
also acknowledges that identities within this context are multiple, complex, sometimes 
complimentary, and sometimes contradictory.  In short, this framework serves as a 
starting place to observe, understand, and hopefully explain this complicated relationship 
between national identity and regional integration in South America.  The aim of this 
research, therefore, is to look at the relationship between Bolivian national identity and 
increased integration, which will be explored and discussed in the following methods 
section. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 To initially research the changes in Bolivian national identity and the influence of 
increased South American integration efforts in recent years, approval was first obtained 
by the Institutional Review Board to do research with human subjects in May 2008 (See 
Appendix A).  With that initial approval, preliminary research and data collection was 
carried out in Bolivia and Peru in May - June 2008.  With continued approval from the 
IRB (May 2009), in the summer of June 2009, people were surveyed in La Paz, 
Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, and Oruro, Bolivia.  
 To investigate the Bolivian perception of increased efforts of South American 
regional integration, this research was conducted using two methods.  First, using open-
ended surveys and interviews, this research builds on the research of Alcántara Sáez 
(2000), who investigated the mostly elite perspective on regional integration. Using the 
opportunistic sampling method, seventy-seven Bolivians throughout the country were 
surveyed and interviewed in universities, hotels, government buildings, banks, local post 
offices, cafés, parks, plazas, internet cafés, at street vending carts, as well as on the street, 
about their opinions and knowledge of regional integration efforts currently at play in 
South America.  
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 Second, to better understand the differing and complementary degrees of Bolivian 
identity, and building on the research of Rose (2008), Bartram (2008), and Waitt (2005) 
the other method used in this investigation was a content analysis of photographs of 
symbols of local, national, and supranational identity.  These symbols were noted and 
photographed throughout the Bolivian landscape.  Two-hundred and seventy four photos 
were taken in Bolivia, in cities, on the road, on trains of the passing rural landscapes, etc.  
The author of this investigation determined all the definitions of symbols of local, 
national, or supranational identity. A content analysis was then conducted to determine 
which level (local, national, or supranational) was most prevalent across the Bolivian 
landscape. 
Survey Demographics 
 Using the first method described above, two separate sets of surveys and 
interviews were carried out in Bolivia.  The first set of surveys was conducted by the 
author in June 2008 in La Paz and Copacabana, Bolivia.  This set produced 16 survey 
responses.  The second set of surveys was conducted in June-July 2009 in La Paz, 
Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, and Oruro, Bolivia.  The second set of 
surveys produced 66 responses.  The combined total was 82 surveys, but five survey 
responses had to be removed because the respondents were not Bolivian citizens.  This 
left 77 responses to be analyzed in this investigation. 
 In order to capture a wide range of socio-economic backgrounds, the situations in 
which surveys and interviews were collected were not limited to only one area (compared 
to only doing this research on university campuses, for example).   The surveys were 
mostly carried out in cities, where the majority of the Bolivian population lives (La Paz, 
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Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Potosí, Sucre, and Oruro).  No small villages or rural areas 
were surveyed in this analysis.  Therefore, the results of this analysis have a geographical 
bias attached to them, as certain areas are well represented (such as Santa Cruz, La Paz), 
while other departments were underrepresented (such as Chuquisaca, Beni, Pando, 
Tarija).   
Survey Design 
 The survey instrument was initially created in English and then translated into 
Spanish (See Appendix B for the English original version and Appendix C for the 
Spanish translation).  The survey instrument was used in interviews as a guide of 
conversation.  The survey took approximately fifteen minutes for applicants to complete. 
 In the first part of the surveys and interviews, the participants were asked for 
some basic demographic information, including gender, age, citizenship, hometown, and 
socio-economic status.   Hometowns were then aggregated with the other responses, in 
order to map and understand if any geographic patterns exist.  Additionally, participants 
were queried to identify which languages they spoke at home, if they had any religious 
affiliations, if they identified themselves with any particular ethnicity, as well as their 
personal employment and their parents’ occupation(s).   The participants were also asked 
to rank their level(s) of identities (local, national, or supranational).   
 In the second part of the survey instrument, the participants were asked about 
their knowledge on current regional integration efforts at play in South America and their 
view on cooperation and proposed integration with Bolivia’s neighbors.  The first part of 
these questions asked the participants if they see Bolivia very connected, dependent on 
other nations and institutions, independent, or isolated from the global community.  In 
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order to understand if the recent changes in Bolivia have impacted the changes in national 
identity, or whether increased integration has influenced the notion of Bolivian national 
identity, participants were asked whether they were aware of any regional integration 
efforts currently at play in South America.  Additionally, the participants were asked if 
they think that regional integration in South America is a possibility in the future, and if 
they are in favor of having a European Union style agreement in South America - that of 
open borders with the free flow of people, money, and commodities.  
 The final part in this series of questions asked the participants if they would be in 
favor of surrendering some, if any, characteristics of national sovereignty and national 
identity.  These characteristics include Bolivia’s national currency (el boliviano), the 
country’s commodity control at the borders, passport control, and the Bolivian national 
anthem.   The reason that these particular elements of national sovereignty were chosen is 
to gauge how far individuals were willing to go to become members in these regional 
organizations.  On the one extreme is passport control and border control, two features 
that many regional integration organizations push to open up the free trade area in the 
early years of these organizations.  On the other extreme are two key elements of any 
national identity and two key features of national sovereignty:  the national currency and 
the national anthem.  The national currency of a country embodies the independent power 
of that nation-state to plan and choose its own economic path in the future.  By ceding a 
national currency for a regional one, like the Euro, countries in part are surrendering their 
independent economic sovereignty.   
 The national anthem of a country generally has the history of that state in the 
words of the anthem.  Therefore, national anthems are very unique to their particular 
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nations.  Few, if any, of the functional regional integration organizations have ever 
required countries to give up their national anthems.  However, the national anthem is an 
interesting variable in this survey to gauge how far citizens of Bolivia are willing to go 
for increased regional integration and to what extent they are willing to surrender 
elements of national identity and sovereignty.   
 After data collection, the surveys and interview responses were grouped into three 
categories:   
1). Those participants who were for integration and willing to sacrifice all characteristics 
of national sovereignty and identity in return for membership and benefits in a 
regional integration organization. 
2). Those participants who were against regional integration and not willing to sacrifice 
any elements of national sovereignty and identity, even if benefits were to be 
gained in a regional organization.   
3). Those participants who were willing to sacrifice certain national characteristics, but 
not willing to give all elements of national sovereignty and identity to any supra-
national institutions (i.e. those who had mixed feelings on sacrificing elements of 
national sovereignty).   
Participant’s responses were then tallied and calculated into percentages using the total 
number of responses.   
Using subtitles for each question, the surveys were then categorized into three 
nominal groups: (1) For regional integration, (2) Against regional integration, and (3) 
Those with mixed feelings, or those who were willing to sacrifice some, but not all 
elements of national sovereignty and identity.  The next step was to map the spatial 
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variability of the responses to see if any geographic patterns for or against regional 
integration exist.  After the responses were divided up into nominal groups, mapping 
software (ArcGIS from ESRI) was implemented to map and analyze the participants’ 
responses.  There were too few responses in both the For and Against regional integration 
categories.   The Mixed feelings category portrayed patterns illustrating citizens’ 
willingness to sacrifice certain elements of national sovereignty and identity, such as 
passport control at the borders and the national currency, el boliviano.  This same 
category also showed that citizens were against surrendering border control, or the flow 
of goods and money across Bolivian borders, and the national anthem, points that will be 
touched on and elaborated on later in this investigation. 
 First, shape file data for Bolivia was obtained, including town, city, and province 
data.   Second, a spreadsheet was created containing the number of survey responses from 
each location in Bolivia.  Latitude and longitude coordinates were also obtained for each 
of these locations.  The spreadsheet was then joined to the Bolivia shapefile and after 
using the select by attributes feature, maps were made to analyze the survey responses.  
Using ArcGIS allows one to visually portray the survey responses, for example, 
according to region, gender, or ethnicity. 
 Additionally, the survey responses were tallied using the total number of response 
to obtain percentages.  Information from survey responses (such as age, gender ratio, and 
languages spoken at home) was then compared to statistical data from the 2001 Bolivian 
Census to first understand how accurately the survey data represented the overall 
Bolivian population, and second to give an overall better understanding of the wider 
Bolivian population, the subject of this investigation. 
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Content Analysis Design 
 Using the second method described in the introduction of this chapter, detailed 
field notes and photographs were taken of symbols of local, national, and supranational 
identity throughout Bolivia and a content analysis was conducted to determine which 
level of identity is most prevalent nationwide and why.   
 Building on the works of Valéria Salgueiro (2006), Phil Kinsman (1995), and 
Gillian Rose (1995), this study looked at symbols of local, national, and supranational 
identity throughout the Bolivian landscape to understand what symbols Bolivians 
experienced most.  Geographers have long studied visual representations, including 
postcards, photographs and more recently, media messages on television and in print, to 
better understand complex phenomena across landscapes.  While some authors use 
photographs as a means of explaining tourist landscapes (Crang 1997), others such as 
Kinsman (1995) look at the influence of symbols on national identity.  Salguiero 
similarly (2006) researches visual uses in the creation of national identity, looking at the 
influential role of public architecture in the creation of Brazilian national identity.  Gillian 
Rose (1995, 1996, 2008) has written numerous articles about “visualized geographies” 
(Rose 1996), giving both a theoretical background in this area of qualitative study, as 
well as methodological suggestions for further use in geography.  
 To understand which level of identity Bolivians experience most, it is necessary 
to first define what symbols of local, national, and supra-national identity are in Bolivia 
and South America.  The author alone determined the criteria to define the levels of 
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identity (local, national, and supranational) and the symbols that portray those levels of 
identity. 
National Identity 
 National identity symbols included the Bolivian national flag and national shield 
(See Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Bolivian National Flags, Crest, Shield, and Símon Bolívar statue, Sucre, 
Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009). 
 
 In addition to the traditional tri-color Bolivian national flag, the Wiphala (See 
Figure 5 was adopted in the January 2009 Constitution as another national Bolivian flag, 
representing the diverse indigenous background of the Bolivian nations (Gobierno 
Boliviano 2009).   
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Figure 5.   The Wiphala (Mercado, 2008). 
 Other common symbols of Bolivian national identity are the national currency (el 
boliviano), the national anthem, the Catholic Church and syncretism, national 
representatives of the government, including politicians, police, and military officers, 
government institutions and monuments. An example of national identity is syncretism – 
the mixing of local, indigenous beliefs with Catholicism.   Orta (1999) suggests that the 
majority of Bolivians practice syncretism.  For example, a Catholic monument with rocks 
atop is an example of syncretism (See Figure 6).  This photo, for instance, shows the 
blending of Catholic icons and traditions (the Cross) with indigenous, nature based 
beliefs (the rocks).   Rocks placed at the highest point in the landscape are said to show 
that a worshipper is closer to his/her God.  Other forms of syncretism are the use of 
Catholic holidays for traditional celebrations (for example the celebration of San Juan – 
June 24th), when people across the country burn firewood to ward off evil.  Another 
example may be the use of Saints for non-traditional Catholic customs, such as el Tio, the 
God of the underworld in Potosí’s Cerro Rico mountain. 
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Figure 6.  Syncretism at pilgrimage site in Copacabana, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2008).   
  
 Government institutions include national level governing bodies as well as 
commemorative statues and monuments showing Bolivian national history, including the 
Bolivian National Revolution Museum in La Paz (See Figure 7).   
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Figure 7.  The National Revolution Museum, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009). 
 Military representatives refer to any national-guard force that defends the 
Bolivian state, including the Bolivian police (See Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Bolivian police amongst protesters, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009). 
 
 Another example of national identity is graffiti, public art, and other messages and 
symbols in public spaces that display strictly national messages or support. National 
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messages would include those that reference a national movement (such as Movimiento al 
Socialismo), touch on the regionalism or the kolla vs. kamba divide, highlight or reject 
national level politicians such as Evo Morales, or show Bolivian nationalism (See Figure 
9). 
 
Figure 9.  “Sovereignty for Bolivia- Unite” Oruro, Bolivia (Source: Stiller Titchener, 
2009) 
 
Local identity 
 Examples of local identity are symbols such as indigenous influenced dress, 
architecture, and agricultural practices.  Indigenous influenced dress refers to any of the 
diverse traditional clothes that some of the Bolivian people continue to wear, such as the 
elaborate costumes seen in La Entrada Universitaria parade, celebrating the diverse 
ethnic groups of Bolivia (see Figure 25), a more fancy form of the pollera (See Figure 
10), or weavings with traditional patterns and colors of the particular indigenous groups.   
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Figure 10. Cholitas (indigenous urban Bolivian women) in traditional dress (Stiller 
Titchener, 2009) 
 
 Indigenous architecture refers to the original housing of the highland indigenous 
groups that was circular rather than square (See Figure 11).  
 
 
 
 Figure 11. Indigenous architecture, Potosí, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009) 
 Indigenous agricultural practices refer to traditional or mestizo practices of  
animal rearing, crop cultivation, and production practices that indigenous peoples, as well 
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as mestizos, across Bolivia still practice. Indigenous agricultural practices can be defined 
by the use of traditional techniques (See Figure 12) and the cultivation of traditional 
crops, such as quinoa. 
 
 
 Figure 12. Indigenous agricultural practices (Stiller Titchener, 2009) 
 
 In addition, city and provincial flags and decorations will serve as symbols of 
local identity.  Figure 13 below illustrates Paceño pride, with the many city flags of La 
Paz (red and green only) largely outnumbering the national flags (red, green, and yellow).  
City and local flags were generally hung next to national flags, but in some cases, the 
sheer number of local or municipal flags outnumbered the national Bolivian flag.  Flags 
that showed the colors of the local province (red for Sucre, blue for Uyuni, for example) 
were considered local flags, whereas any flags that had solely the colors of the national 
flag (red, yellow and green) or mirrored that of the Wiphala were considered national 
flags.   
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Figure 13. Paceño identity, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009).  
 Other examples of local identity are graffiti, public art, and other messages and 
symbols in public spaces that had a local message or local image.   Figure 14 below is an 
example of a local image with a local message: Indigenous or Cholita women with the 
name “colla” (or kolla) portraying the ethnic as well as geographic divide dominating 
Bolivia presently.  This could be interpreted in one of two ways:  The first is that this 
graffiti shows pride of being a colla, or a highlander.  Second, the graffiti could be 
interpreted as an insult against the highlanders, or collas.  An insulting message is 
portrayed in Figure 21- “Colla Maldita” is “damn highlander.”9   Other messages of local 
identity found in public space included graffiti taggings, political messages in spray paint 
supporting the local candidates or political parties, as well as neighborhood murals 
showing neighborhood pride, local soccer teams, local politicians, etc.  Any messages or 
graffiti showing support or rejection of Latin America, South America, or Bolivia were 
excluded from this grouping. 
                                                 
9
 All translations from Spanish to English were done by the author. 
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Figure 14. Graffiti images of cholitas, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009). 
 
Supranational Identity 
 Examples of supra-national identity are the flags of the regional integration 
associations (See Figure 15)  previously discussed, including Mercosur, the Andean 
Community, the Union of South American Nation, the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas, etc. 
 
 Figure 15.   The Union of South American Nations Flag (Andean Community 2009). 
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 Another example of supranational identity is the regional institutions themselves, 
such the Andean Community headquarters in Lima, Peru (See Figure 16), or the Andean 
University in Cochabamba, Bolivia or Cuzco, Peru.  
 
Figure 16.  Andean Community Headquarters, Lima, Peru (Stiller Titchener, 2008).  
 In addition, an example of supra-national identity may be graffiti and other 
messages and symbols in public spaces for hispanoamericanismo or South or Latin 
American pride (See Figure 17). 
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Figure 17.  Latin American pride graffiti, Potosí, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener, 2009). 
 Once these levels of identity were identified and defined, the field notes and 
photos were divided up based on their content and a content analysis was conducted.   
Field notes were mostly collected randomly.  In most locations visited, the author took 
notes of any symbols of national, local, and supranational identity as well as those that 
showed multiple levels of identities observed during my time in that particular location.  
In most cities, including Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, and Oruro, field 
notes and photos were only taken in an ad hoc manner, meaning that there was no set 
time frame or set trek, and therefore the observations noticed in these particular locations 
were done in a random manner.  
Only in La Paz was a more systematic approach taken.  The author traveled to the 
more indigenous city of El Alto, sitting just above La Paz, taking a specific route through 
El Alto, and observing my surroundings for three hours.  The author also traveled to the 
affluent area of La Paz called Zona Sur, where symbols of identity were also observed 
during a specific trek through the suburb and for a specific time period- three hours. 
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The results of the content analysis, therefore, may be skewed by what was 
actually observed and what was not observed.  Also, the results of the content analysis 
may be skewed geographically because the author only traveled to select areas of select 
cities, in select provinces.   Furthermore, the lines between local, national and 
supranational symbols of identity do cross and identities are often embedded or nested 
within other identities. And reactions to the first indigenous Bolivian President, coming 
to power only in 2005, may have also influenced the amount of symbols seen throughout 
the landscape.  Such identities are hard to categorize into three nominal groupings (local, 
national and supranational). Therefore, the author categorized these symbols to the best 
of her ability.   
 Acknowledging the complexity and embedded nature of identity, and the 
multiplicity found using a cultural and political framework, another approach was taken 
to dividing up the photos into a separate category, called Hybrid, as many of these 
contained multiple and embedded levels of identity.  This category included all photos 
that contained more than one level of identity.  Figure 17 is a great example of this, as the 
overall graffiti is portraying Latin American pride.  However, two of the major elements 
of this graffiti show Bolivian miners, a historic symbol of the Bolivian people, and hence 
a symbol of national identity. 
In each location visited, field notes were taken when a symbol of one of these 
levels of identity was observed randomly.  Any photos with symbols showing strictly 
Bolivian identity were grouped into the national category.  All photos of only local 
symbols of identity were grouped into a similar selection, while all the photos with only 
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symbols of supra-national identity were grouped together as well.  From there, these 
nominal groups were further subdivided.   
National Identity Symbols 
 For the national identity symbols, the photos and detailed field notes were 
subdivided into five main categories.   
1). The first grouping was flags, which included the Bolivian national flag, the Bolivian 
national shield and crest, as well as the Wiphala.  Because so many flags were 
observed, the author decided to separate this grouping from the Bolivian 
government.  
2). The second category was the Bolivian government.  This was a general category, 
which included government buildings, monuments, government officials, military 
officials, police officers, government signs, government run transportation, etc.   
3).  The third grouping was graffiti, paintings, and murals, which included all art, 
messages on walls or other areas, national murals, free lance paintings, as well as 
graffiti and other street art.   
4). The fourth grouping was the Catholic Church, which included all crosses and 
churches themselves, and examples of syncretism.   
5).  The last category of national identity symbols was Evo Morales, his political party 
Movimiento al Socialismo (M.A.S.) and messages, propaganda, and graffiti about 
the January 2009 constitution.  I decided to separate this last category from the 
general government grouping and flag grouping because Evo Morales is a 
controversial character in Bolivia and many of these symbols portray or suggest 
the lowland vs. highland divide.  Furthermore, his is just one administration in a 
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long history of Bolivian leaders, so he temporarily represents the government, but 
does not fully signify the Bolivian government as well as some of the other 
symbols do. 
Local Identity Symbols 
 For local identity symbols, the photos and detailed notes were subdivided into 
four categories.  These were indigenous culture, indigenous architecture, local flags, and 
local graffiti. 
1). The first grouping was indigenous culture, which included both indigenous symbols 
and practices.  Under symbols, all decorations or icons that showed 
representations of indigenous figures, historic depictions of suns and faces of the 
various indigenous groups, etc. were grouped together.  Under practices, any local 
markets, indigenous crop cultivation such as quinoa, people weaving, people 
participating in parades with local costumes, such as the Entrada Universitaria10, 
music, and dance, and decorations that portrayed indigenous practices were 
included.  Native dress, such as the costumes seen in La Entrada Universitaria, as 
well as traditionally worn weavings (with particular patterns and colors for 
particular groups) were also included in this grouping, as the customary dress of 
the various indigenous groups is one of the most distinguishing features between 
them. 
2).  The second group was indigenous architecture, which can be distinguished from 
modern architecture in the fact, first, that most structures were round, before the 
                                                 
10
 La Entrada Universitaria is a parade in La Paz in late July, where all university 
departments dress up in traditional costumes of one particular indigenous group and 
celebrate their traditional dance, food, and music.  This celebration lasts over 24 hours. 
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Spanish arrived in Bolivia, rather than square as more contemporary buildings are 
constructed.  Secondly, native architecture can be also distinguished from modern 
architecture by the building materials involved. Those buildings made of natural 
materials, such as straw, mud bricks, etc.  - were considered as indigenous 
architecture in this study.   
3). The third grouping was local flags, which included provincial as well as municipal 
flags.  Local or municipal decorations (or decorations that only included the 
municipal colors) were also included in this grouping. 
4). The last grouping within local identity was local graffiti, which was subdivided into 
four categories.   
A). First was autonomy.  In recent years, there has been an intense debate 
and heated protests about eastern autonomy from La Paz.  Signs for and 
against autonomy were quite visible throughout the media luna, or the 
eastern provinces with the regional capital of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.   
B). The next sub-grouping was the kollas vs. kambas divide.  In this 
category was graffiti from around the country either for or against kollas. 
C). The third grouping within this subdivision was city pride, which 
included decorations representing the individual municipalities.  Flags 
were not considered in this grouping.   
D). The last grouping in this subdivision was graffiti as well as local 
propaganda in one of the recognized thirty-eight indigenous languages 
(Aymara, Quechua, etc). 
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Supranational Identity Symbols 
 For symbols of supranational identity, the photos and detailed notes were divided 
into three categories:  graffiti, statues, and institutions.   
1). The graffiti category included all public murals and messages supporting 
hispanoamericanismo, or Latin American and/or South American pride.   
2). The statues category included Símon Bolívar statues - as he was the independence 
leader for the region, not only Bolivia, and was the first leader to promote the idea 
of Latin American regional integration.  Although he may have pushed for 
independence for Bolivia, he is largely seen within Bolivia as a supranational 
figure, not only pushing for Bolivia’s independence from Spain, but also the 
region’s independence from Spain. 
3).  Last was the category of institutions, which included the buildings and flags of the 
South American regional integration institutions, such as the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur), the Andean Community, the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas, the Union of South American Nations, etc.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
Through the methods described in the previous chapter, the survey data was 
analyzed to get an understanding of the current sentiments on regional integration in the 
region.  The main objective of analyzing this survey data is to understand how aware 
Bolivians are of the current efforts at regional integration, as well as what elements of 
national sovereignty and identity Bolivian citizens are willing to surrender.  Although 
many benefits are thought to be gained by becoming more involved in regional 
integration efforts, what are Bolivians willing to give up in this integration process? Is 
increased regional integration even thought to be desirable for the people of Bolivia?   
Are Bolivians even aware that Bolivia is a member of many regional integration 
organizations in South America?   Are they willing to give up control of the flow of 
goods and money over national borders?  What about passport control over who enters 
and leaves Bolivia?  Are they willing to give up national economic policy, embodied by a 
national currency?  What about the Bolivian national anthem, essentially the history of 
the country?   
 Another important objective of this study is to understand which level of identity 
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(local, national, supranational, or hybrid- meaning two or more levels) is most prevalent 
in the Bolivian landscape.  Once these questions have been answered, further inferences 
can be made about the Bolivians’ perspective on the viability of South American regional 
integration.  
 Bolivia has long been a divided or fragmented nation-state with little to no 
cohesive national unity or identity (Roca 2008).  Bolivia has long been weighed down by 
socioeconomic and ethnicity issues.  It has also been plagued by a deep regionalism 
between the highlanders of the west (Kollas) and the lowlanders of the east (Kambas) 
(Roca 2008).  If this deep regionalism still persists, it may influence whether a Bolivian 
national identity, the smaller sub-national identities, or both predominate in Bolivia.  
Bolivia also only recently gained its first indigenous President, Evo Morales, in 2005 that 
helped to pass a new constitution in 2009.  These factors, in turn, may also affect whether 
Bolivians support or reject the idea of increased South American regional integration. 
In this findings chapter, the first section will include a comparison of the survey 
population to the larger Bolivian population (based on 2001 Census Data, the latest 
available).  This information was included as it helps to show the relationship between 
the survey data to the diverse Bolivian population.  Before any inferences can be made, it 
is important to understand how representative the survey population is of the larger 
Bolivian population in terms of gender, age and languages spoken at home.  
 In the second section, the locations of the survey respondents’ hometowns will be 
discussed, and the perspectives of the survey population on surrendering elements of 
national sovereignty will be reviewed. An overall snapshot of what the survey population  
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is willing (or not) to give up in this process of integration will suggest to what extent 
Bolivians are willing to integrate with their neighbors.    
In the third section, a discussion of the survey respondents’ opinions on regional 
cooperation and increased integration is included.  First, the total survey population’s 
opinions on cooperation with the neighboring countries will be covered, and whether the 
participants want a similar agreement like that of the European Union, with the free flow 
of people, goods, and money in South America.  Second, a discussion of the percentage 
of survey respondents who are aware of any regional integration efforts in South America 
follows.     
 In the last section, the results of the content analysis will be discussed, showing 
which level of identity (local, national, supranational or hybrid) dominates the Bolivian 
landscape.  
Comparison of Survey Data to Bolivian Census Data 
 To fully analyze the survey data, first it is essential to compare the collected 
survey data with recent Bolivian census data (2001 Census Data), as to ensure that the 
collected survey data accurately represents the larger Bolivian population.   
Gender Comparison 
Table 2.  Gender Comparison of Bolivian Census Data to Survey Data11 
Gender Comparison (Source: INE, 2002) 
 Male Female 
Bolivian Population 2001 49.8% 50.2% 
Survey Population 2008 and 2009 
65.0% 
(50) 
35.0% 
(27) 
                Survey sample n= 77 
                                                 
11
 In all the tables that follow, the numbers in parenthesis represent the number of survey respondents. 
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 In terms of gender, the survey population does not directly correspond to the 
larger Bolivian population.  The survey population is comprised of 35% female and 65% 
male respondents.   The results, therefore, are skewed towards the male perspective as 50 
out of the 77 survey responses are from males, with only 27 from females. There are a 
few reasons to explain this discrepancy between the survey data and the Bolivian census 
data in terms of gender.12 
 Although the Bolivian population is roughly equal in terms of gender, traditional 
gender roles are largely still practiced, meaning while men mainly work outside of the 
home, Bolivian women still largely fulfill an integral domestic role, although they 
sometimes also work (sometimes in the informal sector) outside the home.  As Clawson 
(2006, 202) notes, “the traditional roles of women in Latin America have been those of 
faithful mothers, wives, and homemakers.”  Such social stigma meant that women in 
Latin American society have historically had limited educational opportunities.  
Furthermore, there was little professional education that was historically offered to 
women, as Clawson goes on to add: “female participation in the formal economic sector 
has been limited to teaching, nursing, and secretarial-clerical jobs that fit the cultural 
stereotype” (Clawson 2006, 204). 
This trend continues as the United Nations Human Development Report on 
Gender in Bolivia (2003, 1) notes that Bolivian “women have lower levels of human 
development than men and their education and income levels are below those of the 
masculine population.”  Education plays a big role in this social stigma, as boys, and 
hence men, are generally the children of the family that are educated (to some degree) in 
                                                 
12
 When approached and asked about their opinions on national identity and regional integration, many 
women in Bolivia would shy away from me and offer their husbands to answer the survey questions. 
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traditional Bolivian homes.  In Latin America, politics and economics are two subjects in 
which women are just now finally participating (at all levels of government, business, at a 
grassroots level, and in academia).13  
 The focus of this investigation is regional integration and national identity. 
Bolivian women, who have historically had limited educational, political, and economic 
opportunities, may have had little contact with these concepts. This may help to explain 
why Bolivian women first have little to no knowledge of these concepts and therefore 
offered their husbands to answer the survey questions.  And in comparison to the larger 
Bolivian population, this may also help to explain, in part, why the survey results are 
skewed to the male perspective.   
Age Comparison 
 The survey data was also compared to 2001 Bolivian Census data (the latest 
available) in order to determine if this survey population accurately represents the age 
distributions of the larger Bolivian population. 
Table 3. Age Group Comparison of Bolivian Census Data to Survey Data 
Age Group Comparison (Source: INE, 2002). 
  
0-9 
yrs 
10-19 
yrs 
20-29 
yrs 
30-39 
yrs 
40-49 
yrs 
50-59 
yrs 
60-69 
yrs 
70 + 
yrs 
Bolivian Population 
2001 26.5% 23.0% 16.8% 12.0% 9.1% 5.9% 3.7% 3.0% 
Survey Population 
2008 and 2009 
0.0% 
(0) 
10.4% 
(8) 
28.9% 
(22) 
15.6% 
(12) 
23.4% 
(18) 
10.4% 
(8) 
10.4% 
(8) 
0.9% 
(1) 
               Survey sample n =77 
The median age of the survey population is 37.2 years.  The median age of the 
Bolivian population (as of 2010) was 22.2 years (CIA Factbook 2010).  The survey 
population in general is slightly older than the average age in Bolivia, where much of the 
                                                 
13
 This can be seen in recent years with the election of Michelle Bachelet, the first female President of 
Chile, or the election of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina (Vanden and Prevost 2009). 
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population is under 30 years of age (INE 2002).  The breakdown of age comparisons 
shows that the survey population does not directly correspond with the age distributions 
of the entire Bolivia population.  There are several reasons to explain this discrepancy.  
First, as the Institutional Review Board requires that all subjects be of legal age (18 
years+), I was only able to survey people 18 years and older, making only two years valid 
for this age distribution and no one in the 0-9 yrs. category for the same reason.    
Second, arguably, the younger generations of Bolivians may have less knowledge 
about regional integration efforts at play in South America and less general awareness of 
the impact of the recent events and changes in Bolivian state and society.  As discussed in 
chapters two and three, Bolivian identity has changed in the past fifty years.  Many 
members of the younger generations have less of an understanding of what it meant to be 
a Bolivian during the 1952 Revolution or even the 1985 Tin Crisis, than do many of the 
older generations of Bolivians.   
Third, in general, older Bolivians were much more willing to give their opinions 
and perspectives than were the younger generations.  This also helps to explain why the 
survey population has a higher percentage of respondents in the 30-39 yrs., 40-49 yrs., 
50-59 yrs., and 60-69 yr. age distribution groups than the larger Bolivian population.   
Language Comparison 
  Finally, in order to determine if this survey population accurately represents the 
larger Bolivian population in terms of ethnicity and indigenous languages spoken, the 
survey data was also compared to the 2001 Bolivian Census data (the latest available) on 
the languages spoken in Bolivian homes. 
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   Table 4. Language Comparison of Bolivian Census Data to Survey Data 
Language Comparison (Source: INE, 2002). 
  
  Quechua Aymara Spanish Guaraní 
Foreign 
Languages 
Bolivian population 2001 21.2% 14.6% 61.3% 0.5% 2.4% 
Survey population 2009 
15.7% 
(12) 
14.3% 
(11) 
62.3% 
(48) 1.3% (1) 6.4% (5) 
                  Survey sample n = 77 
  In terms of languages spoken at home, the comparison between the survey and 
Census data suggests that the survey population does indeed represent the larger Bolivian 
population.  The percentage of Bolivians who speak Spanish at home is nearly identical 
from the 2001 Census data to the survey population.  The percentage of Bolivians who 
speak Aymara at home is also nearly identical in both the survey and larger Bolivian 
population.  There are two small discrepancies between the survey population and the 
Bolivian population, in Quechua speakers as well as those speaking foreign languages at 
home.   While there is no clear reason for these discrepancies, one reason may be the fact 
that the Quechua speaking peoples of Bolivia are spread to diverse areas of the Bolivian 
altiplano (refer to Figure 3).  However, in terms of the majority of languages spoken at 
home, the survey population does indeed represent the larger linguistically diverse 
Bolivian population.   
 It is clear from the results from this section that there are limitations to this survey 
data, as it does not accurately represent the larger Bolivian population in every category.    
Now that it has been established how accurately (in terms of languages spoken) and 
inaccurately (in terms of age distribution and gender ratio) the survey population 
represents the larger Bolivian population, a more in depth analysis of the survey data can 
be carried out on their opinions on regional integration, national sovereignty, and 
identity.  Due to the limitations of this investigation (geographic bias, gender bias, and 
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small sample size) the results must be interpreted with some degree of caution.  However, 
the results of this investigation are representative of this sample and do shed some light 
on some of the complexities of Bolivia. 
 
Locations of Respondents 
Figure 18.  Map of respondent’s hometowns across Bolivia 
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 Table 5. Hometowns of Respondents  
Survey Respondents, by 
hometown 
  
Number of 
People 
Beni *  1.3% (1) 
Chimate 1.3% (1) 
Cochabamba 10% (8) 
Copacabana 4% (3) 
Cuevo  1.3% (1) 
El Alto  1.3% (1) 
Huarina  1.3% (1) 
La Paz  23% (17) 
Las Yungas  1.3% (1) 
Murillo  1.3% (1) 
None  15% (11) 
Oruro  4% (3) 
Potosí 10% (7) 
Munecas * 1.3% (1) 
San Borja 1.3% (1) 
Santa Cruz  * 15% (11) 
Sucre  3% (2) 
Sur Yungas 1.3% (1) 
Tarija * 3% (2) 
Uyuni 3% (2) 
Vallegrande 1.3% (1) 
         Survey sample n = 77 
(Those denoted by an * are located in the lowlands of eastern 
Bolivia). 
 
In terms of hometowns, 23% of the survey population originates from La Paz.  
Being the capital and the largest city in the country, it was somewhat expected that La 
Paz would have a higher percentage of people calling it home.  Fifteen percent of the 
survey population named Santa Cruz as their hometown.  Ten percent of survey 
respondents called Cochabamba and Potosí their hometowns, respectively.  Four percent 
of the survey population originates from the border town of Copacabana, while another 
four percent of respondents were from the former mining town of Oruro.  Three percent 
of the population came from Sucre, Uyuni, and Tarija, respectively.  Fifteen percent of 
survey respondents did not answer this question.  These results show that this survey 
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sample is geographically skewed to more of the urban areas, and to specific departments, 
including Santa Cruz, La Paz, etc.  Other, more rural departments are underrepresented 
(Beni, Pando, etc.).   The significance of this urban bias is that an urban population is 
more socially aware and generally more progressive, and perhaps may have higher levels 
of acceptance for regional integration efforts currently at play in South America.   This 
urban bias is significant in this study as it may skew the results towards acceptance of 
regional integration, although many rural Bolivians may not tolerate it or even be aware 
of it. 
In terms of regions within Bolivia, kambas (or lowlanders) represent 28% of the 
survey population, while kollas made up nearly 72% of survey respondents (See Table 5).  
This means that the survey results will be skewed towards a kolla (or highlander) 
opinion.  This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the majority of the Bolivian 
population lives in the highland altiplano and valleys (66%), while a smaller portion 
(34%) of the population lives in the eastern lowlands centered around Santa Cruz (INE, 
2002).   
 Table 6.  Comparison of Population by Department, 2001 Census Data to Survey 
Data (Source: INE, 2002).  
Department National Percentage 
Survey 
Percentage 
Beni * 4.38% 2.60% (2) 
Chuquisaca 6.42% 3.90% (3) 
Cochabamba 17.59% 16.88% (13) 
La Paz 28.41% 33.77% (26) 
Oruro 4.74% 3.90% (3) 
Pando * 0.63% 2.60% (2) 
Potosi 8.57% 14.29% (11) 
Santa Cruz * 24.53% 18.18% (14) 
Tarija * 4.73% 3.90% (3) 
(Those denoted by an * are located in the lowlands of eastern Bolivia). 
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Compared to the 2001 Census, this data somewhat mirrors the national population 
distribution within Bolivia.  The eastern provinces of Beni, Pando, and Tarija have 
relatively low population percentages in both the 2001 Census and the survey data.  The 
two departments with the two major cities, La Paz and Santa Cruz, boast the majority of 
the population in both the 2001 Census data as well as the survey data.  For the town of 
Potosí, the survey population was higher than the 2001 Census data.  Cochabamba, 
Oruro, and Chuquisaca all have lower percentages in the survey data, compared to the 
national percentages from the 2001 Census. 
         Table 7.  Responses on ethnicity 
Survey Population: Ethnicity 
  
Percentage 
Aymara 23.4% (18) 
Chiquitano 2.6% (2) 
Guarani 1.3% (1)  
Indigenous 1.3% (1) 
Leco 1.3% (1) 
Llallocoa 1.3% (1) 
Mestizo 27.3% (21) 
None 23.4% (18) 
Quechua 16.8% (13) 
Urus 1.3% (1) 
                   Survey sample n =77 
In terms of ethnicity, the survey population is comprised of nearly equal amounts 
of mestizos (27.3%) or people who identify with a mixed ancestry, people who identified 
as Aymara (23.4%), and those participants who do not identify with any particular 
ethnicity (23.4%).  This high number of responses that did not identify as ethnic in any 
way may be explained by the fact that some participants may have misunderstood the 
question, as etnia (ethnicity) is somewhat of a loaded term in Spanish and could have 
multiple meanings.  Furthermore, due to the urban bias of these results, having surveyed 
many people in urban areas, mestizos or criollo Bolivians may not have any known ethnic 
affiliation.  Quechua participants made up 17% of the survey population, whereas the 
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smaller, less represented ethnic groups, such as Urus, Leco, Llallocoa, Guaraní, and 
Chiquitano only made up one to two percent of the survey population (refer to Figure 3 
for ethnicity map). 
Opinions on Elements of National Sovereignty 
 One of the objectives of this research is to understand what elements of national 
sovereignty and identity Bolivians are willing to sacrifice for increased benefits in one of 
the continental integration organizations, including the Andean Community, Mercosur, 
ALBA, UNASUR, etc.   
 Table 8.  Willingness of Bolivians to Surrender Elements of National Sovereignty 
Sacrifice Elements of National Sovereignty?     
  
National 
Currency Border Control Passport control National Anthem 
No 48.1% (37) 49.4% (38) 37.7% (29) 70.1% (54) 
Yes 44.1% (34) 42.8% (33) 54.5% (42) 7.8% (6) 
No answer 7.8% (6) 7.8% (6) 7.8% (6) 22.1% (17) 
                    Survey sample n = 77 
National Currency- el boliviano 
  Out of the total survey population, 48.1% were against giving up the boliviano if  
a common South American currency were to be introduced.  44.1% of respondents were 
willing to sacrifice the national currency, while 7.8% of the respondents did not answer 
this question.  It is understandable within this context of increased regional integration 
and the recent changes in Bolivian state and society that nearly half of the survey 
respondents were for sacrificing the national currency, while nearly the other half were 
against giving it up.  One respondent had an interesting comment, saying, “Why give 
away our sovereignty when we do not have it now?  It is the hands of foreign politicians 
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and institutions.”14 Although a monetary note, a national currency identifies the nation-
state, as currencies are generally full of symbols of historic national figures, events, and 
places, unique solely to that country (Shore 2000).  It is also a symbol of economic 
sovereignty, showing that the state is in control of its own economic future (Shore 2000).  
 This may help to explain why half of the survey respondents were willing to 
sacrifice this symbol of national identity, while nearly the other half of the survey 
respondents were not willing to give up this element of national sovereignty. One 
respondent noted that by giving up the national currency, the boliviano, “We would lose 
more than we would gain.”  Another respondent noted, “The elders, as well as those who 
cannot read or write, would not know the value of our money if we were to change it.  So 
why change it?”   
 In addition to the challenges integration poses to nation-states’ identities, 
integration also has many economic benefits, which may drive some participants to be 
more willing to surrender the currency than others.   One respondent noted, “The 
economy and the development of Bolivia are more important than nationalist 
aspirations.”  However, in the European Union example, currency was one of the last 
elements of national sovereignty that most countries were willing to sacrifice, showing 
that this is still a contentious issue (Shore 2000).  Still to this day, some EU countries 
have not exchanged their national currency for the regional one (i.e. Great Britain) 
(Redwood 2001).     
 
 
                                                 
14
 All quotations in this findings chapter have been translated from Spanish by the author. 
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Border control 
   49.4% of the survey respondents were against opening Bolivian borders to the 
free flow of money and commodities.  A common reason cited in these responses was the 
problem of narco-trafficking.  One survey respondent noted, “Narco-traffickers, with 
open borders, will more easily enter and leave Bolivia.”  Another survey respondent said, 
“There has to be some sort of control- otherwise narco-traffickers, drug and crime cartels, 
and money laundering will become the norm in our country.”   Bolivia allows the 
cultivation of coca for traditional Andean uses.  However, over the past twenty-five 
years, the Chapare region of Cochabamba province has become a major cultivating center 
of coca, and both Cochabamba and Santa Cruz de la Sierra have become centers of 
cocaine production (Armstrong 2007).  This has led to an increase in international drug 
trafficking and foreign involvement in Bolivian affairs (Vanden 2004).  These issues are 
at the forefront of the hesitation to open up Bolivian borders to the free flow of money 
and goods.   
 Still, other survey respondents noted that relaxing the flow of goods and 
commodities over the borders would be favorable to Bolivians.  One respondent noted 
that, “Due to diplomatic problems with the United States, Bolivia cannot sell its good to 
the U.S.  So, increased free trade with other South American countries will alleviate some 
of Bolivia’s export problems.”  In fact, 42.8% of the survey population was willing to 
open Bolivian borders to increase trade with the neighboring countries.  Reducing trade 
barriers is often cited as one of the first steps in any regional integration efforts (Belassa 
1961).  And as previously discussed, the Andean countries have long had trade relations, 
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institutionalized by the Andean Pact of 1969.   7.8% of the survey respondents did not 
answer this question.   
Passport control 
 37.7% of the respondents were against removing passport control at the borders.  
The main reason cited by these respondents was again the problem of narco-trafficking in 
the region.  One respondent noted that Bolivia should maintain its passport control as to 
keep out “people who do not respect others.”  Another respondent said, “Passport control 
is something that is very much the responsibility of each nation to administer and 
maintain the state’s territorial integrity.”   
However, 54.5% of respondents were willing to remove passport control at the 
borders.  The reason for this majority in support of sacrificing passport control is because 
to a certain degree, passport control has already been partially relaxed between 
neighboring South American countries.  With their national identification cards, 
Bolivians can enter into neighboring countries (Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Chile).  Another reason the majority of Bolivians were for removing passport control is 
due to the un-employment and underemployment situation in Bolivia, as well as higher 
wages in neighboring countries like Brazil and Argentina.  One respondent said that 
decreasing passport control would allow “more exchange of workers across the borders,” 
something that would greatly help Bolivians.  Transnational migration and remittances 
already play an integral role in the Bolivian economy.  By further removing passport and 
visa restrictions, Bolivians would be allowed to seek employment outside of the country, 
thus strengthening the familial as well as national economies.   
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Furthermore, other respondents noted the importance of working on diplomatic 
relations, by opening the borders between former adversary countries of Bolivia- Peru 
and Chile.  One respondent noted that, “the exchange of people across borders would 
help to break old prejudices.”  Another responded that “neighbors should pass national 
borders to get know other peoples, other places, as to open up one’s mind.”   
National anthem 
70.1% of the survey respondents are against giving up the Bolivian national 
anthem.  Many respondents noted that they would be willing to gain a continental wide 
national anthem, but not sacrifice the Bolivian national anthem.  One respondent noted, 
“As long as the idea of a Latin American identity is maturing, why not create a South 
American anthem, in addition to the Bolivian one?”  Only 7.8% of the survey population 
are willing to sacrifice the national anthem if a South American one were to be created.  
One of the respondents in favor of giving up the national anthem stated, “The national 
anthem does not form part of the nation of Bolivia.  It was something imposed upon the 
people during the process of de-colonization, during war-time, to help create more castes 
within our society.  The flag is the same.  It came from the gangs that de-colonized 
Bolivia.”    
22.1% of the survey respondents did not answer this question.   Part of the reason 
for such a high number that did not answer was due to the wording of the question on the 
first survey instrument used in 2008.  It read as national song (canción nacional) rather 
than national anthem (himno nacional).  This may help to explain why the first round of 
survey respondents did not answer this question: it did not make sense to them.15   
                                                 
15
 Other participants seemed insulted by the very question of asking whether they were willing to surrender 
the country’s national anthem.  Some may have not answered that question in protest. 
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 These results suggest that the majority of the survey population is against 
sacrificing the national anthem.  In large part, national anthems are the history of a 
country, combined with a melody.   Many of the survey participants responded that the 
Bolivian national anthem belonged to Bolivians and no one else.  One participant noted, 
“Because in the words of the national anthem, it is said what Bolivia is and who we are as 
Bolivians.”  Others noted that the anthem was “sacred” and that it has the turbulent 
history of Bolivia in the words, so that only Bolivians could identify with it.  One 
respondent noted, “It is part of the identity of Bolivians.  It identifies us as Bolivians.”  
Another said, “It is a historical event that belongs only to us, the Bolivians.”  Another 
response was “It is something sacred of each nation.”  A respondent noted, “Our anthem 
is very important to all of us Bolivians.  Together with our flag, the anthem represents 
much for us because it is part of the mother country.”  In essence, the Bolivian national 
anthem identified them as Bolivians, and at the same time, it helped to differentiate them 
from other Latin Americans.  
In terms of regional integration, in the case of the European Union, all member 
states still retain their individual national anthems while a wider European anthem was 
also created, as to help foster a European identity (Shore 2000).  So, results of this 
analysis portray a similar popular sentiment against sacrificing one’s national anthem for 
a supranational one (Shore 2000). 
Opinions on Regional Integration 
 To better understand how much knowledge Bolivians have on the current regional 
integration organizations, several questions on the survey aimed at gauging this level of 
awareness.  The first asked about whether the participants wanted further cooperation 
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with neighboring countries and in what areas (such as infrastructure, health, education, 
higher education, technology transfer, energy, communications, transportation, etc.).  The 
second question asked if the participants were aware of any regional integration efforts 
currently in South America.  Participants were asked to name any efforts they were aware 
of.  This was an open-ended question.  The third asked if the participant is in favor of an 
arrangement like that of the European Union, with open borders between member states 
and the free flow of people, money, and products across neighboring countries’ borders.   
 
 Table 9.  Respondents’ Awareness of Integration Efforts & Opinions on 
increased regional integration 
Opinions on Regional Integration, Cooperation, totals 
  
For Cooperation 
Awareness of Reg. 
Int. Efforts For EU setup 
Yes 98.7% (76) 26.0% (20) 67.5% (52) 
No 1.3% (1) 74.0% (57) 32.5%  (25) 
       Survey sample n = 77 
 Awareness of regional integration efforts in Table 9 above shows that nearly 
every participant (98.7%) responded in favor of increased cooperation with the 
neighboring countries.  Common areas of increased cooperation noted by these 
participants were primarily in health (building of hospitals) and education, especially in 
higher education.  One respondent noted, “Cooperation could help the enormous problem 
in Latin America of abject poverty.”   Another participant stated, “It would be great if 
cooperation led to the construction of schools for children with few resources, because 
many are illiterate in Bolivia.”   
 Additionally, many of the survey respondents cited technology and free trade as 
areas they would like to see further cooperation with other South American countries.   
Two areas noted by the majority of participants were transportation and infrastructure, 
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two key components of any regional integration effort.  One interesting comment on 
increased cooperation was that “it may help to overcome the regionalisms and 
nationalisms that plague this continent.”  Other respondents noted specific countries, such 
as Peru and Chile, former adversaries of Bolivia, to further promote cooperation.   
Although such a high percentage of survey respondents are in favor of more state 
to state cooperation, only 26% of survey respondents are aware of any regional 
integration currently at play in South America.  Of the 26% that are aware of one of the 
regional organizations, the most commonly cited example is the Andean Community, 
followed by the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), then the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Americas, and then the Union of South American Nations.    74% of the survey 
respondents have no knowledge of any current continental integration efforts.  This 
suggests that the general public is not aware of the movement to integrate the continent.  
It also suggests the need for education programs on this subject. 
    One limitation to the survey instrument was that participants had all open-ended 
questions.  Although most citizens are probably aware of localized projects tied to these 
supranational organizations, in this particular question, it would have been more 
beneficial to list the current regional integration efforts and have them check mark or 
rank the ones with which they are familiar rather than have to come up with the names of 
these efforts currently at play. 
A majority (67.5%) of survey respondents are in favor of establishing an 
arrangement like that of the European Union, with the free flow of money, goods, and 
people.  To a certain degree, this is already happening in parts of South America.  
Bolivians (and other South Americans) can enter into their state’s neighboring countries 
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with only their national identification cards, not a passport.  To go to a non-neighboring 
country, a passport is required.  Furthermore, as Bolivia is a member of the Andean 
Community and an associate member of Mercosur, Bolivia already has preferential 
trading agreements with the majority of its neighbors, meaning that there is movement 
towards a borderless system to a certain degree, at least in terms of commodities and 
passport control.  One respondent noted that, “this process will happen, just like in 
Europe, but possibly even more so here as there is less cultural difference between one 
country and the others.”  Conversely, another respondent noted that, “It worked in Europe 
because the people are educated.  Something bad could happen, for the lack of education, 
order, and self- discipline, this process will not work here because people do not respect 
others’ rights and territories.”   
This information suggests that most survey respondents think cooperating and 
integrating economically and politically with other South American countries is a good 
idea.  However, nearly three quarters of the survey respondents are not aware that Bolivia 
is already in the process of further cooperation and integration with other South and Latin 
American countries, in UNASUR, ALBA, Mercosur, the Andean Community and soon 
with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.  Perhaps this may be 
explained by the lack of transportation or infrastructure connecting many of these 
countries.  Maybe this may be explained by a lack of a public relations campaign by these 
regional organizations or education campaigns within Bolivia.  Furthermore, as many 
Bolivians still live in poverty and many still do not possess the skills of reading and 
writing, perhaps this may be explained by the fact that some Bolivians have no access to 
news media or technology.  Additionally, as stated previously, regional integration and 
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national identity are concepts that are political and economic in nature, and may be 
concepts that the majority of the population are not aware of or have never been educated 
about.   
Alcántara Sáez (2000) suggests that the elite of South America, or people in 
business and politics, perceive regional integration favorably.  Seligson’s (1999) 
investigation of over 18,000 opinions on regional integration suggests that, in general, 
Latin Americans hold a positive view of increased regional integration based on the 
European model.  Seligson (1999, 138) notes, “Overall, then, policy makers in South 
America who wish to press for regional economic integration can be confident that in 
every country majorities of those holding an opinion would support it and in most 
countries only less than a fifth of the population opposes economic integration.”   In his 
analysis, Bolivians were at odds, with 72.3% for, 17.5% against, and 10.2% with no 
opinion (Seligson 1999, 138).   
This current investigation of Bolivians’ sentiments on integration, although much 
smaller in sample size, shows that 67.5% of the population is for, while 32.5% of the 
survey population is against the idea of regional integration in South America.  Seligson’s 
analysis is based on 1996 data, whereas the data used in this study is from 2009.  This 
discrepancy may suggest that fewer Bolivians now, than in 1996, are in favor of 
increased integration in South America.   
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Regional Comparison 
Table 10.  Comparison of kollas’ (highlanders) and kambas’ (lowlanders) awareness of 
integration efforts & opinions on increased regional integration. 
Opinions on Regional Integration, Cooperation, by region 
  For Cooperation 
Awareness of 
Reg. Int. Efforts For EU setup Against EU setup 
Kambas 22.1% (17) 7.8% (6) 19.4% (15) 5.2% (4) 
Kollas 76.6% (59) 18.2% (14) 48.1%  (37) 18.2% (14) 
No 
answer 1.3% (1) 74.0% (57) 0.0% (0) 9.1% (7) 
                  Survey sample n = 77 
 More highlanders (kollas) were for increased regional cooperation than were the 
lowlanders (kambas).  In this sample, kollas in general are more aware of regional 
integration efforts than are the kambas but this may be explained by the fact that more 
kollas were surveyed than kambas, as six out of the seven cities visited during the 
summer of 2009 were in the highlands.  The only city visited in the lowlands was Santa 
Cruz de la Sierra.  Furthermore, 74% of participants who had no knowledge of any 
regional integration efforts which show that either the survey instrument was flawed with 
open-ended questions on this particular question, or that citizens generally have no 
knowledge of these supranational efforts taking place, even though they are more aware 
of the local projects associated with these larger efforts.   
Overall Opinions on Regional Integration 
         Table 11.  Overall Opinions on Regional Integration 
Opinions on Regional Integration    
  Mixed Feelings For Against  
Total 81% (63) 
3% 
(2) 
16% 
(12) 
                        Survey sample n = 77 
 
 Out of the total survey population, 81% had mixed feelings on surrendering 
elements of identity and sovereignty, meaning that they were willing to sacrifice some, 
but not all elements of national sovereignty and identity.  Only 3% or two out of 77 
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respondents were for sacrificing all these elements.  Twelve out of 77, or 16% of 
respondents were against sacrificing any elements of national identity and sovereignty to 
a larger supranational entity.  
 One way to interpret this data is to look at Bolivia’s history to help understand the 
current sentiments on national sovereignty and Bolivians’ sense of identity.  The country 
has experienced over 100 revolutions since its independence from Spain in 1809 
(Armstrong 2007).  Like Colombia, in recent years Bolivia has been at the forefront of 
the American sponsored war on drugs.  This has led to foreign intervention in Bolivian 
political and economic affairs, producing unintended social problems.  Miller notes “the 
socially disruptive effects of organized crime, primarily relating to drugs trafficking, and 
the state’s compromised attempts to control it, mean that many Latin Americans, 
particularly the poorest, live in the midst of what is effectively a state of war”  (Miller 
2006, 210).   Foreign demand for coca-derived products has led to foreign involvement 
on Bolivia territory.  Miller (2006, 210) argues, “all of these factors meant that the 
sovereignty of Latin American nation-states was often highly compromised.”  
 Furthermore, on the domestic front, Bolivia in the last decade has also somewhat 
faced the issues of ethnicity, inclusion in state and society, and a cohesive national 
identity.  Having finally gained agency in its own path of development, Bolivia in recent 
years is trying to re-assert its sovereignty.  This re-assertion of Bolivian national 
sovereignty can be seen in various actions, such as the nationalizing of the gas and oil 
industries, along with the airline and train companies.  This can also be seen in Bolivia 
re-asserting territorial sovereignty by removing the United States Ambassador (Chávez 
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2008), and rejecting the use of Bolivian soil for foreign military operations (as was 
established in the 2009 Constitution), etc. (Gobierno Boliviano 2009).  
 As a result of the long history of “compromised sovereignty” in Bolivia, it is 
understandable that 16% of the survey population was completely against sacrificing any 
elements of national sovereignty and identity to any larger entity (Miller 2006, 210).  It is 
also understandable that the majority (81%) of the survey population has mixed feelings 
about sacrificing some and/or any of these elements of national sovereignty and identity.  
One respondent questioned “why would Bolivia give up any element of its national 
sovereignty, especially after it just gained back a large portion of its territorial 
sovereignty from foreign companies and governments?”   The only answer provided by 
the respondent was that Bolivia would continue to gain sovereignty before it would 
sacrifice or surrender any further elements of its national sovereignty.   
Content Analysis Results 
 Using the methods described in the previous chapter, a content analysis was 
conducted on the various symbols of national, local, supranational and hybrid identities 
observed throughout the Bolivian landscape.  In addition to how Bolivians self identified 
in the surveys and interviews, the content analysis of symbols throughout the country 
helps to provide a better understanding of what symbols Bolivians experience the most.  
Referring back to the historical overview chapter, symbols and visual representations are 
often used by states (and other entities such as organizations and companies) to create a 
sense of belonging (Smith 1991, Guibernau 1996).   
The content analysis does have skewed results, in part because of the fact that the 
author did not travel to certain departments of the country, only traveled to select cities, 
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and within those select cities, only traveled to certain parts of the cities.   Therefore, the 
content analysis results are skewed geographically, as they did not include any photos or 
field notes from cities in Pando, Beni or Tarija departments.  Additionally, the results of 
this content analysis may be skewed as there were limitations of what was noticed and 
documented, and what was not observed within each of the cities visited. 
 Given that the results may be skewed, symbols of national identity dominated the 
landscape throughout the country, although this was more pronounced in the altiplano 
and valley cities (La Paz, Cochabamba, Sucre, Potosí, Uyuni, Oruro) than it was in the 
eastern lowland city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.  This may be explained by the fact that 
the eastern lowlands (media luna) are striving to obtain autonomous agreements with La 
Paz.  
Table 12.  Percentages of symbols observed throughout the Bolivian landscape 
Content Analysis Results  
 National Hybrid (2+) Local Supranational 
Total 41.6% (114) 35.8% (98) 20.4% (56) 2.2% (6) 
                     n = 274 
In total, 274 photos were reviewed and categorized depending on which level 
(local, national, supranational, or hybrid) of identity dominated.  Of the four categories, 
symbols of national identity dominated the Bolivian landscape- in urban, rural and peri-
urban areas, in the barren and inhospitable altiplano and even (to a lesser degree) in the 
eastern lowlands.   Of the 274 photos reviewed in this content analysis, 114 contained 
elements of national identity.   
National Identity 
Symbols of national identity are created to help tie the state and nation together 
and to make citizens feel that they are a part of the larger nation (Smith 1991). The 
Bolivian state has long struggled with legitimacy among the population.  As Guibernau 
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(1996) notes, in illegitimate states, national symbols must be sustained over time to 
continually invoke the feelings of belonging and to gain legitimacy.  An example of this 
continuous showing of the state’s symbols was the adoption of the Wiphala (see Figure 
11) as another national flag through the 2009 Constitution (Gobierno Boliviano 2009). As 
Mach (1993, 106) notes, “Radical change in a political system, like revolution, generally 
brings changes in the symbolic system of a state which consists…in the introduction of 
those symbols which represent the new ideology and the new political group which took 
over.”  In the Bolivian case, the Wiphala is that symbol- showing the indigenous 
backgrounds, still intact and not blending with one another.   Mach further adds, “Old 
symbols are often revived in new contexts and meanings.  The idea behind such symbolic 
manipulation is to identify the new state with the nation, or at least, with those segments 
and social forces of the nation whose support is sufficiently important to the new ruling 
elite”  (1993, 106).  The Wiphala has historical meaning for many of the indigenous 
groups of Bolivia.  Evo Morales and the M.A.S have effectively recreated the Wiphala to 
solidify support from the majority of the population, a group that before rarely identified 
with the Bolivian national flag.  Now, a common symbol to them is also a national flag 
representing Bolivia.  This has been effective in rallying people around a new Bolivian 
national identity, one based proudly not only on the criollo past, but also the indigenous 
past.   
 Furthermore, symbols of national identity were commonplace, especially in the 
two capitals, La Paz and Sucre.  In nearly every placed visited (with the exception of 
Santa Cruz de la Sierra), national flags, shields, historic figures and statues, plaques, 
plazas, government buildings (see Figure 19), catholic churches, murals depicting the 
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Bolivian national revolution, the national tin mining industry and their role within the 
Revolution, graffiti in support of Bolivian sovereignty and independence, and police and 
military officers were visible in every place visited.  
 
 
Figure 19. Government Buildings, Plaza Murillo, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 
2009) 
 
Even in the high, inhospitable altiplano between Uyuni and Potosí, symbols of 
national identity were present in the landscape (see Figure 20).  
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Figure 20.  Graffiti in support of the 2009 Constitution, Province of Potosí, Bolivia 
(Stiller Titchener 2009). 
 
 
Table 13.  Content Analysis Results:  Categories of symbols of  
national identity throughout the Bolivian landscape (n =114). 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the five categories that the national symbols were divided into, the Bolivian 
government was the most prominent, making up 40.4% of the national symbols observed.   
Representatives, symbols, and buildings of the government were prominent landmarks 
across Bolivia.  Secondly, Bolivian flags comprised 29.8% of the national symbols 
observed throughout the landscape.    
National Symbols   
  Percentages 
Bolivian government 40.4% (46)  
Bolivian flags 29.8% (34) 
Evo and MAS 14.0% (16) 
Graffiti 8.8% (10) 
Catholic Churches 7.0% (8) 
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Opinions regarding Evo Morales (see Figure 21) made up 14%, while graffiti and 
murals (of the National Revolution, the War of Independence, the Tin Crisis, etc.) made 
up 8.8% of the total national symbols viewed.   
 
 
Figure 21.  Graffiti about Evo Morales, “Evo – damn highlander” shows kolla vs. kamba divide, 
Santa Cruz, Bolivia.  (Stiller Titchener 2009) 
 
The Catholic Church was the least prominent in this category, making up only 7% 
of the total number of national symbols analyzed in this section, the majority of which 
were found in Potosí.  Armstrong (2007, 259) notes that over 80 churches were built in 
the aftermath of the silver mining of Potosí of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
But for the Spanish, as Armstrong notes, Bolivia was the source of great riches, not for 
religious conversion.  Perhaps this factors into why so few Catholic Churches were 
observed.  
Hybrid Identities 
Hybrid or multiple identities were observed throughout the Bolivian landscape 
and were visible in 98 out of the 274 photographs analyzed in this content analysis.  This 
represented 35.8% of the photos, the second highest category. These 98 photos contained 
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images in which more than one level of identity was observed or one level of identity was 
embedded within one of the others.  This hybridity or use of multiple levels of identity 
was seen in graffiti, murals and most commonly in local (43 photos) and national (49 
photos) levels of identity. With a total of fifteen images, the grouping of paintings, 
murals, and graffiti of national symbols were especially embedded with other messages, 
integrating more than just the national level of identity with local as well as supranational 
identities.   Half of the photos (6 out of 12) containing supranational symbols of identity 
also contained national or local symbols.  
The reasoning behind such a high number of hybrid or multiple levels of identity 
present throughout these photographs is first, because levels of identity are not easy to 
categorize into neat groupings.  Identities are not neatly defined into groups and certainly, 
images or symbols representing such identities are neither easily categorized into four 
nominal groups.   Identities overlap, as do the symbols that represent identities.  Again, 
Figure17 is a wonderful example of hybrid identities.  The graffiti, in the words, shows 
Latin American pride.  However, the picture of this graffiti portrays Bolivian miners, a 
historic symbol of the Bolivian people, and a symbol of national identity.  Figure 23 is 
another example of this, as the language of the graffiti is in Aymara, an indigenous 
language, and much of the subject of the graffiti places emphasis on local movements and 
traditions.  Still, the graffiti shows a symbol of Bolivia- the miners- seen in the middle of 
the graffiti.  
Second, because of the recent changes in Bolivian state and society, as mentioned 
previously, Bolivian notions of identity are changing, and in that process, Bolivians are 
using new found symbols such as the Wiphala, mentioned above, as well as using old 
 118
symbols such as the national and municipal flags.  Figure 26 also shows multiple levels 
of identity next to one another with the Bolivian flag next to the Uyuni and Potosí flags 
(See also Figure 28). 
Local Identity 
 Out of the 274 photos taken and analyzed, 56 were found to contain elements of 
local identity. 
Table 14.  Content Analysis Results: Categories of symbols of 
local identity throughout the Bolivian landscape (n = 56). 
Local Symbols  
 Percentages 
Indigenous practices 46.4% (26) 
Graffiti 17.9% (10) 
Local flags 17.9% (10) 
Indigenous symbols 10.7% (6) 
Indigenous architecture 7.1% (4) 
 
Local symbols were also notable throughout the country.  Indigenous practices, 
including indigenous dress and costumes, decorations, agricultural practices, markets 
practices with women selling weavings and food stuff made up 46.4% of the total local 
symbols viewed (See Figure 22).   
 
     Figure 22.  Market in Oruro, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009).  
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Local graffiti (in indigenous languages- see Figure 23) and murals depicting local 
customs comprised 17.9% of the local symbols observed, most common in Oruro and 
Potosí, and to a lesser extent in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Sucre.   
 
 
 
  Figure 23.  Local graffiti, Oruro, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009) 
 
 Symbols of indigenous art were observed in La Paz (see Figure 24) and Oruro, 
but to a lesser extent in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Sucre, Uyuni, and Potosí.   
 
 
 
  Figure 24.  Indigenous art in La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009) 
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 The kolla/kamba divide was also prevalent throughout the big cities in the 
altiplano and valley cities as well as in Santa Cruz in the East in graffiti, in local 
decorations, and in costumes in the many parades observed while in country (see Figure 
25).  
 
Figure 25.  Kolla pride, La Entrada Universitaria, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 
2009) 
 In nearly every city visited, a municipal flag was seen flying next to the Bolivian 
national flag (see Figure 26).  Local flags made up 17.9% of the local symbols observed 
throughout the landscape. 
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Figure  26.  Local Uyuni flag next to Bolivian flag, Uyuni, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 
2009).   
 Uyuni and Santa Cruz (see Figure 27) boasted more local pride than other cities 
such as Oruro and Potosí, two former economic powerhouses of Bolivia (Armstrong 
2007).    
 
Figure 27.  Top: “Always Free Cruceños We Will Be,” flag reads “Our Anthem is 
Sacred,” Santa Cruz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009). 
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In both La Paz and Sucre, local symbols were not as visible as the national 
symbols of identity.  Also, as 2009 was the Bicentennial for Bolivia’s independence from 
Spain, symbols of national identity might have been exaggerated in an effort to celebrate 
this two hundred years anniversary (see Figure 28).   
 
Figure 28.  From right: Local La Paz flag with Bolivian national flag and Bicentennial 
Banner, La Paz, Bolivia (Stiller Titchener 2009) 
 
 Indigenous architecture made up only a small portion (7.1%) of the local identity 
symbols, and was only visible in the province of Potosí (see Figure 5).   This can be 
explained in part by the fact that the author did not travel to many rural locations, where 
perhaps this type of architecture may be more visible. 
Supranational Identity 
Table 15. Content Analysis Results: Categories of symbols of 
supranational identity throughout the Bolivian landscape (n =6) 
 
 
 
Supranational Symbols 
  Percentages 
Statues 50.0% (3) 
Graffiti 16.6% (1) 
Institutions 33.4% (2) 
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Of the 274 photos and field notes reviewed in this content analysis, only 12 
showed supranational identity or messages, but six also contained other levels of identity, 
making only 6 photos out of the 274 show only supranational identity.   In total, only 
2.2% of all the photos and detailed field notes portrayed symbols of supranational 
identity.  Statues of Símon Bolívar, the founder of the independence movement for the 
entire region, were the most common symbols of South or Latin American identity.  As 
the founder of the Bolivian state and as the revolutionary leader of the Andean region, 
statues of Bolivar are commonplace throughout the region.    
 Murals depicting Latin American pride were common in the altiplano cities of 
Uyuni and Potosí (see Figure 17), but were not observed in any other places in Bolivia.  
Last, regional integration organizations were only visible in select cities, such as 
Cochabamba, where these organizations’ institutions are located. 
Overall, the lesson learned throughout this content analysis is that identities 
overlap and are often embedded within other identities.  Symbols representing those 
identities also overlap which was found to be common in Bolivia.  As mentioned 
previously, after recounting the photos to determine which contained multiple levels of 
identities, a total of 98 out of 274 showed this integration of various levels of identity, 
representing nearly 36% of the photo analyzed.  
Scope, Limitations, and Suggestions 
The scope of this analysis was quite large, studying regional integration across a 
continent, while the size of my sample within one country in the entire continent was 
quite small (only 77 responses).  A random sample was not conducted equally across the 
entire Bolivian territory.  Therefore, the data of this analysis does contain a geographic 
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bias, as certain departments, such as La Paz, Cochabamba, or Potosí are well-represented 
while others, such as Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Santa Cruz are underrepresented.  
Additionally, this data set contains an urban bias, as the author visited no villages and 
few rural areas.  This study also contains a gender bias, as far fewer women were 
surveyed than men.  Consequently, the results of this analysis do possess their limitations 
and results should be interpreted with caution. However, these results are representative 
of this sample and shed some light on the complexity of identity in Bolivia.    More time 
in the field in Bolivia in each location as well as in more rural areas around the country 
may have produced different results.  Less than ten weeks in this complex country was 
not nearly enough. 
In the content analysis section of this investigation, there were limitations to the 
author’s definitions of each level of identity (local, national, supranational, and hybrid).  
Additionally, this part of the analysis was limited as grouping photos of complex 
landscapes, with overlapping scales of identity in each into neat categories, proved a 
difficult task.   The content analysis does have skewed results, in part because of the fact 
that the author did not travel to certain departments of the country, only traveled to select 
cities, and within those select cities, only traveled to certain parts of those cities. 
Furthermore, there were also limitations of what was noticed and documented, and what 
was not observed within each of the cities visited.  
The suggestions for a further survey of Bolivians’ opinions on regional 
integration in South America would include changing the wording, the language, and the 
form of the questions on the survey instrument.  Instead of all open-ended questions, 
providing some questions with examples already given may be more helpful, including 
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some binary (yes/no) questions, checking all that apply questions, as well as ranking 
questions may have provided much more discernible results.   An important question 
missing from the survey instrument was education level.  Education level and urban 
exposure are two of the leading factors in determining political attitudes.  Certainly, 
education level would have provided important results in this study.    
Furthermore, this survey instrument only aimed at gauging the larger (or 
supranational level) regional integration efforts- meaning institutions, meetings, regional 
goals, etc.  Another limitation of the survey instrument is that it did not allow participants 
to differentiate between local level regional integration efforts that have grown out of 
these larger efforts, such as, for example, fronteras libres.   
I would also conduct survey testing by including various locals’ reactions into the 
survey instrument, as to attain the exact translation necessary to extract this information, 
before starting this project again. Another important lesson learned during this process is 
to ask for locals’ help.  My Spanish is from Spain- a long way from Bolivia, where the 
colloquialisms, slang, dialect, etc. is quite different.  Also, the survey instrument 
contained much academic writing in it, which was confusing for some participants.   A 
basic knowledge of Aymara and Quechua, and translations of the survey instrument into 
these languages would prove immensely helpful as well.  Additionally, I would ask more 
people more questions about why they answered the surveys in the ways that they did 
(i.e.- why did they feel an attachment to one identity over the others?).   Through this 
process, I learned a great deal about cross cultural dealings while in Bolivia, including 
how to approach people, how to find contacts, what contacts expect, what participants 
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expect, etc.  I learned how to diplomatically approach people and show them what I had 
to offer while not appearing like I wanted to only extract information from them.   
There were many lessons learned during this process, one of which was to have 
many backup plans.  When doing work abroad, and especially in Latin America, politics 
and events on the ground can change very quickly while everyday happenings in Latin 
America move very slowly- so being prepared, flexible, and patient were important 
lessons learned during my two trips to South America.  My limited survey instrument and 
my shyness proved to be two challenges that showed a need to take more qualitative 
classes, as to be more comfortable surveying and interviewing people.   
Funding a trip abroad for research was another important lesson learned during 
this process and one that showed the integral need for grant writing, proposals, and 
money for research.  I also learned of the importance of research ethics in this process 
and dealing with the Institutional Review Board.   
Lastly, I learned that a project like this has the ability to take on a life of its own.  
The scope of this study was huge, but for my first international research project and with 
limited funding, I was only able to take on this idea in Bolivia, and even there with 
limited success.  With these experiences and insight, this study may likely lead to a 
bigger project in the future.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this investigation has been to understand the opinions of Bolivian 
citizens who have lived through, arguably, one of the most dynamic periods of Bolivian 
history, the past fifteen years.  At the same time, regional integration organizations have 
been established in recent years, while others have re-organized in an effort to tie the 
South American continent together economically and politically.  The survey respondents 
of this study have provided insightful opinions from a grassroots perspective on regional 
integration in South America.  Furthermore, their opinions have given insight as to what 
has most influenced Bolivian national identity in recent years- changes at the national 
level or increased regional integration efforts.   
 To promote solidarity or to access more markets, driven by national or regional 
interests, for many reasons both economic and political, Latin Americans are attempting 
to fully integrate the region. Victor Raul Haya de la Torre once said, “Latin America is 
the Patria grande (Great Fatherland) of which each of its component states is an 
inseparable and interdependent part” (quoted in Whitaker and Jordan 1966, 161). 
Historically, this may have been and still is the dominant thought in Latin American 
debates.  Yet, until the challenges, tensions, and issues at the national level are fully 
resolved, regional integration efforts in the area will continue to stagnate. 
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Long a divided country and lacking a cohesive national identity, this analysis 
reveals interesting results about Bolivia, as the majority of respondents now identify in 
terms of national identity, as Bolivians.  One way to interpret these results is to think 
about all the national changes that have occurred in Bolivia since 1996, the year from 
which data was used in Seligson’s analysis.   
To give a brief overview of these national changes, in 1993, President Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada took office, implementing neoliberal reforms (Shroeder 2007).  In 
1997, Hugo Banzer assumed the presidency and in 1998, implemented forced coca 
eradication programs with “Plan Dignity” (Morales 2009, 585).  This provoked coca 
growers unions and worker-peasant unions to set up roadblocks and carry out strikes.   
In 2000, Bechtel Corporation privatized water in the Cochabamba valley, which 
provoked the “Water War” protests (Morales 2009, 586).  Following the incident, martial 
law was imposed in that city for two months (Morales 2009).  That same year, peasants 
blocked the road from El Alto to La Paz for a month, essentially isolating the capital La 
Paz from the rest of the country.  
 In 2001, President Jorge Quiroga assumed office, canceled the Bechtel contract, 
and continued to promote neoliberal policies in other areas of the economy (Morales 
2009).  In 2002, the Bolivian Congress kicked out the leader of the largest coca growers 
union in Bolivia, Evo Morales, which further solidified support for him and his party, 
Movimiento al Socialismo (Morales 2009).   
In 2002, Sánchez de Lozada again assumed the presidency and attempted to 
further privatize national assets.  In 2003, a “gas war” over privatization of Bolivia’s 
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natural gas reserves provoked massive protests and forced Sánchez de Lozada to flee 
Bolivia and take up exile in the United States (Morales 2009, 586).   
Carlos Mesa took office as interim President in 2003.  By 2004, Mesa already 
encountered trouble, after he held a referendum on the gas reserves where “80 percent of 
voters approved the proposed Hydrocarbon Law” (Morales 2009, 586).  Mesa however, 
did not sign the measure into law and subsequent protests forced him to call for new 
elections in 2005.   
In the elections of 2005, Evo Morales won the presidency with a majority vote 
(Vanden and Prevost 2009).  One of the first measures this administration sought to 
accomplish was the “renationalization” of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons and energy minerals 
(Morales 2009, 586).  However good his intentions were, Evo Morales has been unable to 
please everyone.  The eastern lowlands, the area most affected by the renationalization of 
Bolivia’s oil and gas industries, have experienced the majority of the loss of foreign 
direct investment.  Ever since, the eastern lowlands (known as the media luna, or half 
moon) have proposed and fought for regional autonomy agreements from La Paz.   
Furthermore, Morales’ call for a new Bolivian constitution provoked bloody 
protests in Sucre in 2007 (Morales 2009).  The new constitution was voted on and 
accepted by the majority of the Bolivian population in January 2009 (Gobierno Boliviano 
2009).  Although there have been some upsets and many issues remain, voters 
overwhelmingly supported Evo Morales in another landslide victory in December 2009 
(El País 2009). 
In short, in the past fifteen years, Bolivia has experienced a lot in terms of 
political, economic, and social change.  Bolivia has had six Presidents in fifteen years.  
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The country has experienced the effects of the U.S. sponsored eradication programs and 
neoliberal policies, which cut state spending on domestic needs such as welfare and 
education (Shroeder 2007).  As a result of these policies, Bolivians have carried out many 
protests in the past fifteen years and have experienced three “wars”- first the war on 
drugs, second the water war of 2000, and third the gas war of 2003 (Morales 2009, 585-
586).   
Because of the scale of protests in the past decade, Bolivia has become the focus 
of the international community as a leader against globalization and neoliberal policies, 
and for indigenous rights (Shroeder 2007, Vanden 2004).  All of these factors have 
certainly provoked changes in Bolivian state and society.  With these changes, questions 
about ethnicity, identity, and inclusion in society have come to the forefront of Bolivian 
state and society.  This may explain why Bolivians now are less in favor of increased 
regional integration than in Seligson’s (1999) article based on 1996 data.   
Although no exact reason is discernable from the present data, it is clear that 
national events have been at the forefront of Bolivian society for the past decade.  
Although Bolivia has progressed in overcoming some of the real challenges in the nation 
and state building process in recent years, other challenges still remain.   Four tensions 
remain that have yet to be resolved.  First, is the large tension between ethnic identity (or 
identities) and a unifying national identity.  Albo (2008, 30) states that this cleavage is 
the “oldest and most enduring conditioning factor affecting both politics and social 
formation in Bolivia.”  He further adds “neither biological mestizaje during the colonial 
period, nor the subsequent period of cultural mestizaje has managed to replace it” (Albo 
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2008, 30).  This tension of national vs. ethnic identity is one that has yet to be resolved, 
but is currently at the forefront of Bolivian politics.   
The second tension Albo (2008) identifies is that between ethnicity and class as 
identity, something that in Bolivia has historically been intricately tied together.  The 
cooperation between the worker-peasant unions and the coca growers unions after “Plan 
Dignity” was implemented in 1998 shows how these two groups, as well as class and 
ethnic identities, are still tied together in Bolivia (Morales 2009, 585).  The third tension 
Albo (2008) notes is the urban-rural tension, although this has become much more 
complex by the mass migration to urban areas, as discussed previously.   
The fourth tension Albo (2008) notes is the regionalism between the highland 
kollas and lowland kambas.  Albo calls this tension currently the most divisive, stating 
“in its current form, this dualism has taken on a new aspect which according to some, 
could break asunder the viability of Bolivia as a country” (2008, 33).  This tension is 
based on the important role that local and regionalized identities have historically played 
in Bolivia.  Lacking a cohesive national identity and even a common language until the 
mid 1970s, Bolivians historically identified in terms of their ethnic or sub-national 
identities.   
This last tension is based on long standing divisions: “the ecological, cultural, 
socioeconomic, and political differences between the Andean macro region and the 
lowlands goes back to pre-colonial times and have persisted with only minor changes” 
(Albo 2008, 33).  With such historical legacies, this strain currently presents the biggest 
obstacle in Bolivian national cohesion.  This tension was visible in the landscape, as all 
cities except Santa Cruz de la Sierra boasted many symbols of national identity.  
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Conversely, the few symbols of national identity in Santa Cruz were government 
buildings and churches, with only a few flags, decorations, etc. supporting the Bolivian 
state.  In Santa Cruz, local, autonomous based identity was the only symbol highly visible 
in graffiti, in posters, murals, and in local flags.  
As previously stated, the issue of ethnicity, long a sore spot in Bolivian state and 
society, has recently been acknowledged and somewhat dealt with.  This tension between 
the eastern lowlanders (kambas) and the western highlanders (kollas), however, is still 
festering.  These tensions are the real challenges the Bolivian state must face to become a 
stable state and a cohesive nation.  It is a great step for Bolivia to have its first majority 
winning, indigenous President.  As Albo states, however, “we continue to confront 
problems and issues which have long historical roots” (2008, 34).  Historical cleavages 
are difficult to reverse with only a break with the past, as was the election of Evo Morales 
in 2005.  This remains the true challenge that Bolivia must face to overcome in its long 
list of political, social, and economic differences among its population and in the 
Bolivian attempt to create and sustain a cohesive national identity.   
Only a few decades ago, Bolivia lacked a common language spoken by the 
majority of the population, and most Bolivians identified themselves in terms of local or 
ethnic identities.  Bolivians today view the past fifteen years as a continuation of the 
ideals of the 1952 Bolivian National Revolution, as fulfilling some of the promises of a 
legitimate state with an inclusive national identity, shared by all Bolivians.  Changes in 
the Bolivian political structure, along with foreign involvement in Bolivian affairs greatly 
changed the political atmosphere in the late 1990s and early 2000s, paving the way for 
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the entrance of new political actors.  However, Bolivia only recently gained full control 
over its own territory, assets, and affairs.  
Through the use of mostly qualitative methods, including open-ended surveys and 
a content analysis of visuals observed throughout the Bolivia landscape, this study sought 
to understand first the awareness of Bolivians of regional integration efforts taking place 
in South America.  Second, this study sought to understand whether Bolivian citizens 
were willing to surrender any elements of national sovereignty and identity to this 
supranational cause.  Third, this study sought to understand what level of identity 
Bolivians experience most in the landscape. 
The final results of the surveys were that the majority of Bolivians thought further 
cooperation and increased integration were good for Bolivia.  Bolivians today hold a 
favorable view of regional integration in South America.  However, the majority of the 
respondents had no knowledge of any specific regional integration efforts currently at 
play in South America. The vast majority of the survey respondents have mixed feelings 
on sacrificing or surrendering any elements of national sovereignty in exchange for 
membership in one of the regional organizations.  Bolivians were more willing to give up 
passport control than any other element questioned in this investigation in part because 
the free flow of people across South American borders is already occurring to a certain 
degree.  The importance of these findings is that it shows that Bolivians are at least 
willing to make concessions in the integration process, even if they are unaware of 
specific regional integration efforts in their area.  This is an important first step towards 
integrating the South American continent. 
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The final results of the content analysis on visuals observed throughout the 
Bolivian landscape were that more national symbols were noted than hybrid, local or 
supranational symbols.  This may suggest that Bolivians are experiencing a reinforcement 
of Bolivian national identity through the symbols they see most often.  However, 
identities do overlap and symbols representing those identities were multiple and often 
overlapping in the photographs analyzed in the content analysis.  In fact, 98 out of the 
274 photos analyzed in this section contained overlapping levels of identities, suggesting 
that the Bolivian notions of identity may be more complex than just local, national, and 
supranational identities.   
As mentioned previously, identities may have been influenced by the events of 
the past decade, including the Water War and Gas Wars of the early 2000s, the 
subsequent protests, the rise of the first indigenous President of Bolivia, and the 
implementation of a new Constitution in 2009.  As complex and fragmented as Bolivia 
has historically been, it may take a longer time for a real cohesive national identity to 
develop.  Perhaps the results of this content analysis (showing the majority of symbols 
observed throughout the landscape as national) suggest that Bolivians are working 
towards creating an inclusive Bolivian identity, common to all Bolivians.  It is clear 
through the results of this analysis that the complex notion of identity, seen throughout 
Bolivian history, remains true to this day in Bolivia.    
In conclusion, by using a cultural and political ecology framework, this study 
sought to investigate and analyze current South American regional integration efforts and 
affects of these efforts on Bolivians’ sense of national identity.  Previous studies, such as 
Seligson (1999) and Alcántara Sáez (2000), were often limited in their analyses and 
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explanations of South American integration because they lacked a framework that allows 
for multi-scalar analysis, the study of transnational networks, as well as a focus on 
identities in these processes.  As mentioned previously, both Seligson (1999) and 
Alcántara Sáez (2000) address Latin American sentiments about increased regional 
integration, yet neither scholar seeks to explain how increased regional integration in the 
region is affecting identities (civic, national, collective, etc.), and what consequences this 
will have on the individual nation-states and the larger regional integration efforts 
currently at play in the region.  Seligson acknowledges that even his study does not 
devote enough attention to the notion of national identity in the integration process.  He 
states, “nationalism in Latin America has frequently been underestimated because of the 
relative infrequency of international wars in the region during the present century.  
Perhaps nationalism will fade along with the militarism and dictatorship of the past, [but] 
the present data set does not allow the exploration of that probability” (Seligson 1999, 
150).   Seligson’s statement further acknowledges the need for more research on this 
complex relationship between increased regional integration and changes in allegiances 
and identities.   
Additionally, by using a cultural and political ecology framework, this 
investigation sought to reveal the complexity of the integration process and the peoples 
involved.  People simultaneously hold varying and differing levels of allegiances and 
identities, tied to the nation, the state, gender, occupation, family, neighborhood, 
province, etc.  And as mentioned above, identities are not static over time.  Considering 
the recent changes in Bolivia, the subsequent transformations in Bolivians’ notions of 
national identity, and Bolivia’s role in the ongoing process of South American regional 
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integration, this study sought to shed light on the complex relationship between of the 
obstacles Bolivia faces in the integration process and the changes these might provoke in 
identities in Bolivia.  Furthermore, this study has emphasized the need for further study, 
using a cultural and political ecology framework, on the relationship between national 
identities and regional integration efforts, especially within the Latin American context.    
Finally, my suggestions for policymakers within this region are that identities in 
Bolivia are complex, multiple, and overlapping.  Increased regional integration, and the 
surrender of certain elements of national identity and sovereignty, may have implications 
on these already complex notions of Bolivian identity.  Policy makers in South America 
and within Bolivia need to be aware of this.   
Assumed by the author throughout this investigation is the fact that regional 
integration is seen as desirable and needed for the South American countries to develop 
politically stable and economically sound structures in the future.  It is also assumed that 
regional integration will provide desired results for all the citizens involved.  These 
assumptions, however, are not necessarily true, and each country thinking about further 
integration must balance the advantages and disadvantages seen in such an arrangement.  
If this process is seen as valuable and worthwhile, then citizens may understand why 
there is a need to surrender certain elements of national identity and sovereignty to a 
larger entity.  If this process is not seen as needed, then citizens may not be willing to 
cede these elements.  This all depends on the relationship between the state and the 
people living within that state and the level of trust between the two.   
In Bolivia, a state that has traditionally lacked popular legitimacy, there is a great 
need to promote a public awareness and education campaign about this idea and the 
 137
benefits to be obtained and the disadvantages to be experienced in the integration process.  
Although this investigation shows that the majority of Bolivians surveyed were willing to 
make concessions in this integration process, the lack of education on these issues to the 
general public is a major obstacle in the future promotion of these efforts. 
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Appendix B:  English language survey 
 
Investigation Questions: 
The Viability of South American Regional Integration: Bolivian National Identity in the 
Integration Process. 
 
1). What is your gender?  ________ Female    ___________ Male 
 
2). How old are you? __________________ 
 
3). Are you a Bolivian citizen?  Yes   ________    
No _________  (Where are you from?)  _____________________ 
 
4). Do you have any ethnic affiliation(s)?    ___________________________ 
_____________________________________________                                                                                
             
5). Where is your family’s hometown?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6). What is your level of income?  ___________  Wealthy   _________  Middle Class 
_______________ Poor     _______ No income. 
 
7). What language(s) do you speak in your home? ______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
8). What religion(s) do you practice?  ______________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
    
9). What are your parents’ employment? ______________________________________ 
 
10). What is your employment?  _____________________________________________ 
 
11). How would you describe yourself?  Which level is most important to you?   
___________  Bolivian         ______________  South American   
 ____________ Other Identities (Paceño (La Paz locals), Cochabambino (Cochabamba 
locals), Sureño (Sucre locals), Cruceño (Santa Cruz locals) etc. 
 
12). Do you think that Bolivia is in control of state resources as well as the future of the  
country? Do you see Bolivia well connected or dependent on other countries or 
institutions? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13). Would you like to see more cooperation between Bolivia and its neighbors of South 
America?  In what ways? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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14). Are you aware of any regional integration efforts in South America?  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15). Do you think that South American regional integration is a possibility in the future? 
Why or why not? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16). The European Union has an arrangement of open borders with the free flow of 
people, money, and commodities.  Are you in favor of a similar agreement in South 
America? Why or why not?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17).  Are you willing to sacrifice some elements of sovereignty, if in exchange, Bolivia 
gains membership and benefits in one of the South American regional integration efforts, 
like UNASUR?   
Of the four elements here, which are you willing to sacrifice?  
 
The national currency- el boliviano: Yes_______ No____________ 
Reason:_________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Control of money and commodities at borders: Yes  ________   No ___________ 
Reason:_________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Passport Control: Yes  ______________  No ___________________ 
Reason:_________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The national anthem:  Yes__________ No___________ 
Reason:_________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Do you want to receive final analysis results? If so, please add your address here to 
receive results in May 2010: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix C:  Spanish language survey 
 
Preguntas de investigación: 
La viabilidad de integración regional de Sudamérica: La identidad nacional de Bolivia en el 
proceso de integración. 
 
1). ¿Cual es su sexo?  ________ Feminino    ___________ Masculino 
 
2). ¿Cuantos años tiene usted? __________________ 
 
3). ¿Es usted ciudadano/a de Bolivia?  Si   ________    
No  _________  (¿De Donde es Usted Pues?)  _____________________ 
 
4). ¿A cual etnia pertenece usted?    ___________________________ 
_____________________________________________                                                                                
             
5). ¿De donde es su familia?  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
6). ¿Cual es su nivel de ingreso?  ___________  Adinerado   _________  La media clase 
______________ Pobre     _______ sin ingresos. 
 
7). ¿Cual(es) idoma(s) se habla(n) en su casa? ______________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
8). ¿Cual(es) religión(es) practica usted?  ______________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
    
9). ¿Que es el empleo de sus padres? ________________________________________ 
 
10). ¿Que es su empleo?  _________________________________________________ 
 
11). ¿Como usted se describía a si mismo/a?  ¿Que es lo más importante para Usted?   
___________  Boliviano/a         ______________  Sudamericano/a   
 ____________ Otro (Paceño, Cochabambino, Sureño, Cruceño, etc?) 
 
12). ¿Usted piensa que Bolivia está en control de los bienes del estado asi como el futuro 
mismo del país? ¿O lo vee como muy conectado o dependiente en los demás naciones e 
instituciones? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
13). A usted, ¿le gustaría ver mas cooperación entre Bolivia y los vecinos de 
Sudamérica? ¿En cuales maneras? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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14). ¿Usted se ha enterado de algún esfuerzo para integrar economicamente su país con 
otros vecinos de Sudamérica?  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15). ¿Piensa usted que la integración regional de Sudamérica es una posibilidad en el 
futuro?  ¿Por que si o por que no?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16). La union europea tiene un acuerdo de fronteras abiertas, con el paso libre de 
trabajadores, dinero, y bienes. ¿Usted estaría en favor de un acuerdo parecido en 
Sudamérica?  ¿Por que si o por que no?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
17). ¿Usted estaría en favor de ceder algún grado de soberanía, si en cambio, Bolivia 
gana calidad de miembro en una organización regional de los paises de Sur America, 
como UNASUR?  De los cuatro temas aquí, ¿cual(es) de ellos a usted, no le importaría 
ceder?   
 
La moneda nacional- el boliviano: Si_______ No____________ 
Porque:_________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Control de la corriente de dinero y bienes: Si  ________   No ___________ 
Porque:_________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Control del pasaporte: Si  ______________  No ___________________ 
Porque:_________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
El himno nacional:  Si___________ No___________ 
Porque:_________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  
¿Usted quiere recibir los resultados del analysis final?  Por favor, añade su dirección aquí 
donde quiere recibir los resultados en Mayo 2010:  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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